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THE LEGACY OF BYRD v. HALL: GOSSIPING ABOUT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TENNESSEE
JUDY M. CORNET*
I. INTRODUCTION

For the past several years, in my Civil Procedure II class I have
supplemented the summary judgment materials in the textbook with the
Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in Byrd v. Hall.' In our summary
judgment unit, we read, in order, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,2 the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Record
exhibits referred to in the Court's opinion, the Celotex case on remand,4 and
finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court's "adoption" of Celotex in Byrd.5 In
Byrd, the Tennessee Supreme Court, while purporting to adopt the federal
standard for evaluating the movant's burden when the nonmovant bears the
burden of proof on an issue, actually established a more rigorous standard for
movants in Tennessee courts.
My presentation of Byrd is intended to highlight all of its weaknesses. I
hope that my students, having read the Celotex opinions, will quickly spot the
misreadings of that case by the Tennessee Supreme Court. These
misreadings, which have previously been catalogued by June Entman,6 are
fairly serious. The court mistakenly stated that the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the summary judgment and insisted that the Supreme Court
failed to endorse unsupported summary judgment motions.7
In addition to these weaknesses, the opinion suffers from the fact that it
is almost entirely dicta. In fact, the proposition that the Tennessee Supreme
Court itself presented as noteworthy and the one for which it has frequently
been cited as seminal in later cases-its "adoption" of the Celotex standard for
summary judgment-is dictum pure and simple because the Celotex standard

* Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law. I would like to
thank Deseriee Kennedy, Don Paine, Jerry Phillips, and Penny Tschantz for their comments on
this Article. I am especially grateful to Dwight Aarons and Carol Parker for their many
thoughtful contributions, and to Kerry Knox, Class of 2003, for his outstanding research
assistance. I am also grateful to my Civil Procedure II students over the years. The views
expressed in this Article and all remaining errors are, of course, my own.
1. 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
2. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
3. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
4. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
5. 847 S.W.2dat 214.
6. See June F. Entman, Flawed Activism: The Tennessee Supreme Court's Advisory
Opinions on Joint Tort Liability and Summary Judgment, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 193 (1994).
7. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 212-13.
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was irrelevant to the dispositive issue in the case. June Entman classifies this
aspect of Byrd as "flawed activism" and criticizes the case on this basis.'
However, the result, and indeed, the relevant analysis, was right; to my
knowledge, all commentators, including Entman, agree upon that.
Several years ago, following my presentation of Byrd in my Civil
Procedure II class, my students succeeded all too well in spotting the flaws of
the case. One student raised his hand: "Why are we reading this case," he
queried, with a frown, "if it is so bad?" The purpose of this Article is to
answer the question, "Is Byrd v. Hall a bad case?" To do this, I will first ask
whether the opinion adheres to basic principles of judicial discourse. I will
examine the rhetoric of the opinion in terms of the characteristics of
hierarchical legal discourse,9 and I will ask whether the opinion shares in the
"lower" form of discourse called "gossip" by Patricia Meyer Spacks.' °
Second, I will trace the "reception histor[y]" " of Byrd v. Hall in terms of both
the texts it has generated and the practices it has motivated.
By analyzing this case, I have transformed my own understanding of it:
despite its apparent weaknesses, this case has provided Tennessee with a firm
foundation for a stable summary judgment practice and may well have spared
Tennessee some of the problems that have been noted in federal practice.
II. RECALLING CELOTEX

It is impossible to appreciate Byrd v. Hall without understanding the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Celotex.' Celotex is part of the
1986 "trilogy" of summary judgment cases (the other two are Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. "3and MatsushitaElectricIndustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp."4) that has been credited with working a "revolution" in federal
summary judgment jurisprudence. 5 In Celotex, the widow of an industrial
worker who died from asbestosis brought a wrongful death action against
several defendants, including Celotex, which had allegedly manufactured the

8. Entman, supra note 6, at 193 (commenting that "[t]he Tennessee Supreme Court's
recent activism is flawed").
9. See generally PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS,
RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987).
10. PATRICIA MEYER SPACKS, GOSSP (1985).
11. See generally JEROME J. MCGANN, THE BEAUTY OF INFLECTIONS 7 (1988).
12. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
13. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
14. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
15. Thomas R. Freeman, A Wrong Turn in Summary Judgment Law, 23 L.A. LAW., JulyAug. 2000, at 68. But see Lawrence W. Pierce, Summary Judgment: A Favored Means of
Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 279, 286 (1987) (arguing that the 1986
trilogy did not "create new law" but merely "encourage[d] broader use of summaryjudgment").
I am indebted to Dwight Aarons for bringing this article to my attention.
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asbestos that had caused the decedent's disease.' 6 Celotex moved for
summary judgment, alleging that the "plaintiff had 'failed to produce' any
evidence that her decedent had ever been exposed to Celotex asbestos."'"7 The
motion was unsupported by affidavits or other discovery materials; instead,
the defendant filed only a
two-page "Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine
Issue" and a three-page "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" which
asserted that the plaintiff had failed to identify any evidence in responding
to two sets of interrogatories propounded by Celotex and that therefore the
record was "totally devoid" of evidence to support plaintiffs claim. '
In response, the plaintiff pointed to three items already in the record that
supported her allegation that her husband had worked with asbestos
manufactured by Celotex. 9
The trial court granted summary judgment, but the D.C. Circuit reversed,
holding that the defendant's motion "was rendered 'fatally defective' by the
fact that [defendant] 'made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of
affidavits or otherwise, to support its motion.' 20 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the motion was sufficient to shift the burden of
responding to the plaintiff;2 because the D.C. Circuit had not addressed the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's response to the motion, the Court remanded for
that evaluation.22
The most revolutionary aspect of Celotex was the defendant's failure to
support its motion for summary judgment with anything other than the
assertion that the plaintiff had no evidence to prove an element of its case
(causation).2 3 The Sixth Circuit later referred to a Celotex-type motion as
16. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319.
17. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 335 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The three items were as follows: "(1) a letter
from an insurance representative of another defendant describing asbestos products to which
plaintiff's decedent had been exposed; (2) a letter from T. R. Hoff, a former supervisor of
decedent, describing asbestos products to which plaintiff had been exposed; and (3) a copy of
decedent's deposition from earlier workmen's compensation proceedings." Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 321 (quoting Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)).
21. Id.at327-28.
22. Id. at 326-27. On remand, the D.C. Circuit panel held 2-1 that plaintiff had met her
burden of creating a genuine issue of material fact in response to Celotex's motion. Catrett v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33,40 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
23. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320. The Court in Celotex also reaffirmed its earlier holding in
Anderson that the standard to be used in evaluating a summary judgment motion was identical
to the directed verdict standard. See id. at 323. This aspect of Celotex was also a part of the
"revolution" worked by the 1986 trilogy. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A DistortedMirror The
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' The issue for decision by the
requiring the opponent to "put up or shut up."24
United States Supreme Court was whether this sort of motion satisfies the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56-in other words, did
Celotex's motion even qualify as a valid motion for summary judgment? If
the motion was valid, then under Rule 56, the plaintiff had to respond or face

a summary judgment, in essence, by default. If the motion was not valid, then
the plaintiff had no duty to respond, and no summary judgment could be
entered. The Supreme Court was not required to-and indeed did not-address
the issue of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs response to Celotex's motion.
Writing for a four-member plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that nothing in Rule 56 requires "that the moving party support its motion with
affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim."25 Instead,
Rehnquist stated, the movant must merely "bear[] the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. '2 6 The
defendant's supporting documents did that by pointing to the plaintiffs
alleged failure, in answering two sets of interrogatories, to identify evidence
supporting the decedent's exposure to Celotex asbestos.2 This assertion was
enough to shift the burden of producing evidence to the plaintiff. It made
sense, according to the plurality, for a summary judgment motion to be used
to weed out insubstantial claims, claims in which the party having the burden
Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95,99 (1988). In the words of the Anderson Court, "the
trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable
conclusion as to the verdict. If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of evidence,
however, a verdict should not be directed." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51 (citation omitted),
cited in Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In the current version of the Rules, directed verdict is known
as "judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
24. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no
standard definition of a "Celotex-type motion." The term has at least two possible meanings.
First, it can refer merely to a motion that is unsupported by evidentiary material. Second, it can
mean a motion, whether supported or unsupported, asserting that the nonmovant cannot prove
an essential element of his case and that the record as a whole contains no evidence supporting
the essential element. In this Article, I use the term "Celotex-type motion" to incorporate both
these definitions: a motion unsupported by evidentiary material asserting that the nonmovant
cannot prove an essential element of her case and that the record as a whole contains no
evidence supporting the essential element. See infra note 66.
25. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (emphasis omitted).
26. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
27. See id. at 320. In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that Celotex's motion
ignored the three items already in the record. 1d. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover,
defendant's counsel admitted at oral argument that, prior to filing the motion, he had been
informed that plaintiff intended to call at least one witness to testify to Mr. Catrett's exposure
to Celotex asbestos. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of proof on an element had failed to produce any evidence to support that
element.28 It was not necessary, said the plurality, for the movant to negate
an element of the plaintiff s claim: the movant need not produce evidence of
a negative.29 The distinction is between the movant's saying,"I can disprove
it," and saying to the opponent, "You cannot prove it." The former had
always been an acceptable basis for a motion for summary judgment; the issue
in Celotex was whether the latter was also acceptable.3
Unfortunately, the concurring opinion of Justice White, the fifth member
of the majority voting to reverse, adds a confusing qualification. While
agreeing with the plurality that "the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding
that the moving defendant must always support his motion with evidence or
affidavits showing the absence of a genuine dispute about a material fact,"'"
he insisted that "[i]t is not enough to move for summary judgment without
supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the
plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case....

It is the defendant's task to

28. Id. at 327.
29. Id. at 325,.
30. For the plurality to assert that the movant did not have to prove a negative, it had to
deal with the leading precedent on summary judgment, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144 (1970). In this case-which I teach as the first case in the summaryjudgment unit, as much
for its wonderful historical and social interest as for its procedural value-the plaintiff sued
Kress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after she was arrested for vagrancy outside the Kress store in
downtown Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146. The plaintiff, a white teacher,
had attempted to eat lunch at Kress's lunch counter with six of her African-American students.
Id. Although the waitress took the students' orders and they were served lunch, the waitress
refused to serve the plaintiff. Id. at 146-47. As the store manager later explained, he was afraid
that a "mob" was developing in reaction to the sight of the "mixed group" in the store. Id. at
154 & n. 10. He therefore gave a prearranged signal to the waitress, indicating that she was not
to serve the plaintiff. Id. at 154. As the group left the store, the plaintiff was arrested by a
Hattiesburg police officer. Id. at 146. The plaintiff's civil rights claim was based upon her
assertion that the police officer and the manager of the Kress store conspired to see to it that she
was arrested. Id. at 148. Kress moved for summary judgment, alleging that there was no
evidence that the police officer and the store manager had conspired. Id. Kress supported its
motion with affidavits from police officers and from its employees denying any conspiracy. Id.
at 153. In response, the plaintiff pointed to several items of evidence, none of them admissible
at trial, suggesting that the police officer who subsequently arrested plaintiff had been present
in the store when she was refused service. Id. at 156-57. The Supreme Court reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the defendant's failure to negate the
possibility that there was a police officer in the store at the time plaintiff was refused service
was fatal to its motion. Id. at 157-59. Because Adickes had been uniformly read as requiring
the movant to negate the elements of the plaintiff's claim, the Celotex plurality felt that it had
to distinguish Adickes. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to do so, Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325-26, commentators have generally felt that his effort was unsuccessful and that Adickes
was, in fact, silently overruled by Celotex, see, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at
Sixty, 76 TEx L. REv. 1897, 1912 (1998).
31. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
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negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the suit."32 As June Entnan has noted,
this assertion is "inconsistent" with the plurality opinion and, indeed, is
inconsistent with the result." Justice White based his support for a remand
on the fact that the D.C. Circuit had not addressed the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's response.34 Of course, if the motion itself was insufficient under
Rule 56, the issue of the plaintiff s response would be irrelevant, because the
plaintiff would have had no burden to respond. Thus, by concurring in the
result, Justice White was saying that Celotex's summary judgment motion,
unsupported by any evidentiary material and not even purporting to negate any
element of the plaintiff's claim, was sufficient; but his insistence that
"conclusory assertions" of no evidence are insufficient says that Celotex's
motion was insufficient from the outset and, therefore, the sunmaryjudgment
should have been denied. This Push-me/Pull-you quality of White's
concurrence became crucial to the Tennessee Supreme Court in Byrd v. Hall.
Ill. BYRD v. HALL: THE OPINION
The first paragraph of the Byrd opinion announced its ambitions:
The sole issue presented in this tortious interference with employment
case concerns the proper standard to be applied when evaluating a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure.... We granted the Plaintiff's Rule 11 application in order to
establish a clearer and more coherent summary judgment jurisprudence in
view of the increased use of Rule 56 as a vehicle designed to implement the
objectives ofthe Rules ofCivil Procedure-the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of litigation."
From the court's description of its appointed task, we can assume two things:
(1) either the trial court applied the wrong standard in evaluating the motion
for summary judgment here, or the trial court applied the correct standard but
had to swim upstream against the tide to do so; and (2) Tennessee's summary
judgment law had been less clear and less coherent than desirable prior to
Byrd. The court gave adequate notice of its intention to use the case at bar to
address apparent systemic problems in Rule 56 practice.
Consistent with its announced intention to "establish... jurisprudence,"
the court began its discussion, not with the facts of the case at bar (those
appear only on the ninth page of the ten-page opinion), but with a historical

32. Id. (White, J., concurring).
33.

Entman, supra note 6, at 217. But see infra note 66.

34. 477 U.S. at 328-29 (White, J., concurring).
35. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 209 (1993). A Rule II application is an application
to the Tennessee Supreme Court for a discretionary appeal from the Tennessee Court of
Appeals. See TENN. R. APP. P. 11.
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survey of "Tennessee Summary Judgment Standards."36 The court emphasized
the venerable heritage of summary judgment in the United States-"Varying
forms of summary judgment proceedings have existed in this country since
1769"-and in Tennessee--"Summary judgment statutes were adopted in
various forms by some states, including Tennessee, in the 1800s."38 After
noting the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970, the
court turned to its interpretation of present Rule 56, with the following
transition paragraph:
Since its adoption, Rule 56 has undoubtedly made its impact felt in
literally thousands of cases. As the bench and bar can readily attest, motions
for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 are now fairly routine and are
filed almost as a matter of course. For this reason, an analysis of the Rule's
provisions and its parameters is appropriate.3
Again, the court announced its intention to address, not just the summary
judgment motion in this case, but all of Tennessee summary judgment
practice. And, again, there is the faint suggestion that something had gone
wrong. Although the court quoted the Advisory Commission comments that
call the rule "important and desirable" and "a substantial step forward,"4 we
are left with the feeling that the court was concerned by the "fairly routine"
use of Rule 56. Earlier, however, the court noted the "increased use of Rule
56 as a vehicle designed to implement the objectives of the Rules,"4 ' which
is hardly a bad thing. It is beginning to seem as though the court was
ambivalent about summary judgment.
This apparent ambivalence continues in the court's examination of the
"heart of the summaryjudgment procedure," Rules 56.03 and 56.05.4" While
noting that "summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut but
rather an important vehicle for concluding cases that can and should be
resolved on legal issues alone,"' 3 the court dropped a footnote to declare,
"This court continues, however, to take a dim view of the use of summary
judgment in workers' compensation cases." The Tennessee Supreme Court
is notoriously sympathetic to workers' compensation claimants,4 but

36. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 209.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39.

Id. at 210 (emphasis added).

40. Id. (quoting TENN. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory commission's comments).
41. Id. at 209.
42.

Id. at 210. The current version of these rules is found at TENN. R. CIv. P. 56.04 and

56.06. The corresponding federal rules are FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(e).
43. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210.
44. Id. at210n.1.
45. See Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984) (recognizing a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim);
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highlighting the exception here only emphasized the theme of ambivalence.
For almost two pages, the court cited hornbook law about summary
judgment, providing future litigants and courts with wonderful, authoritative
quotes on the basics of summary judgment practice.' The court then turned
to "Federal Summary Judgment Standards," noting that, because federal Rule
56 is "virtually identical" to Tennessee Rule 56, "federal authorities provide
helpful guidance for our interpretation of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56.""4 The court
introduced the 1986 trilogy as the solution to a problem that had developed in
federal summary judgment law:
Rule [56] was infrequently used for most of its existence because it was
plagued with ambiguities and restrictive interpretations. However, when the
federal courts began to experience the pressure of crowded dockets and
parties' mounting litigation costs, some courts and commentators thought the
time was right for recognizing and developing the potential of summary
judgment in helping cope with these problems."
Here, it seems, the court identified a contrast between federal summary
judgment practice and Tennessee practice: while the Tennessee rule had been
used on a "fairly routine" basis, the federal rule had been used too
infrequently. If the 1986 trilogy was a remedy for too infrequent use of Rule
56, it is unclear how the trilogy would address any problems arising from the
"fairly routine" use of summary judgment in Tennessee. However, the court
noted that the three cases "address[ed] some of the critical issues inherent in
the application of Rule 56."" Thus, to the extent the trilogy was designed to
eliminate the "ambiguities" in prior federal practice, the cases could prove
useful to the court in its announced project of "establish[ing] a clearer and
more coherent summary judgment jurisprudence."5
The court began its discussion of the trilogy with Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc." Notably, however, the court avoided ever stating the most
revolutionary holding of Anderson-thata court must consider the standard
of proof in ruling on a summary judgment motion.5 2 In Anderson, a libel case,

Garrett v. Corry Foam Prods., Inc., 596 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tenn. 1980) (refusing to bar a
workers' compensation action because of dismissal of previous action "with prejudice").
46. For example, "The court is not to 'weigh' the evidence when evaluating a motion for
summary judgment." Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211.

47. Id. at 211 & n.2.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 211-12 (citations omitted).
Id. at 212.
Id. at 209.
51. 477 U.S. 242 (1986); see Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 212.
52. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. The Court in Anderson also held that the standard for
evaluating a motion for summary judgment is identical to the directed verdict standard. Id. at
251. This aspect of the case has also been cited as part of the revolutionary nature of Anderson.
See Stempel, supra note 23, at 157; supra note 23.
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the plaintiff would have had to prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence." The Supreme Court held that, in determining whether the plaintiff
had produced enough evidence in opposition to the summaryjudgment motion
to create a genuine issue of material fact, the district court should have applied
the clear and convincing evidence standard.54 The closest the Tennessee
Supreme Court came to stating this holding was its recognition that "[t]he
Court ruled that the materiality of a fact for summary judgment purposes was
to be governed by the substantive law of the claim or defense at which the
motion was directed,"" and that the Court had rejected the "scintilla of
evidence" standard.56
When the court moved on to Celotex, its analysis began to suffer not just
from omissions, but also from errors. The court incorrectly stated that the
Supreme Court "upheld the grant of summary judgment for the defendant"
because "[t]he plaintiff was unable to meet her burden imposed by Rule 56.05
with regard to that dispositive element"-exposure to the defendant's
product.5 7 The court's statement of the holding makes it sound as if the issue
before the United States Supreme Court was the sufficiency of the
nonmovant's response to a proper motion for summary judgment by the
defendant. In fact, the real issue in Celotex was the sufficiency of the motion
itself, unsupported as it was by any affidavits or discovery materials. The
United States Supreme Court, after finding that the motion was sufficient,
remanded for a determination of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's response."
The Tennessee Supreme Court quoted two paragraphs from Celotex; the
first is as follows:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

53. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
54. Id. Commentators have noted that this holding essentially instructs trial courts to
weigh the parties' respective evidence at the summary judgment stage, something that lawyers
had always understood to be forbidden. See Stempel, supra note 23, at 149-50.
55. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 212.
56. Id. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving
party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which thejury could reasonably
find for the [nonmoving party]." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
57. Id. at 212-13. It is interesting that, in describing the United States Supreme Court's
action, the court referred to the Tennessee version of FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Id. Even in this

small detail, we can begin to see the Tennessee court exerting transformative rhetorical authority
over the United States Supreme Court cases. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
The Tennessee Supreme Court is not alone in misreading Celotex in this way. See Kent Sinclair
& Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A ProposalforProceduralReform in the Core Motion
Context, 36 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1633, 1652-53 (1995) ("In each of [the 1986 trilogy) cases,
the Supreme Court reinstated summary judgments for defendants by overturning restrictive
circuit court interpretations of Rule 56.").
58. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to thatparty's case, and on which that
party will bearthe burden ofproofat trial. In such a situation, there can be
no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.5 9
The Tennessee Supreme Court used this language to support its statement
about the significance of Celotex:
Celotex thus stands for the proposition that, after the moving party has
establishedthe absence of a genuine issue of materialfact, then summary

judgment is appropriate when, after being given a reasonable opportunity to
substantiate its claims, the nonmoving party is unable to establish any
essential element of its case on which it will have the burden of proof at
trial.'
However, the United States Supreme Court's statement about the nonmoving
party's burden is pure dicta, because what was at stake in Celotex was whether
the movant had succeeded in "shifting the burden" to the nonmovant to
respond at all. Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court's statement of what
Celotex stands for actually focused on dicta in that case, skimming over the
real issue in the "after" clause emphasized above.
The second paragraph from Celotex quoted by the Tennessee Supreme
Court is as follows:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any"
which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.'
Here, at last, is a quotation that addresses the real issue in Celotex. The
United States Supreme Court found that the defendant in Celotex had
succeeded in meeting its burden of"demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact." ' But the Tennessee Supreme Court avoided reaching
the same result by modifying its endorsement of this language with the
following: "Justice White's concurring opinion correctlyplaces afinerpoint
on the Court's holding by observing that '[i]t is not enough to move for
summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a

59.

Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 213 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23) (emphasis added).

60.

Id. (emphasis added).

61.

Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

62.

Id.
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conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case.""
Although the defendant in Celotex had done just that-assert, without
supporting materials, that the plaintiff could not prove an element of her
case-the Tennessee Supreme Court accepted Justice White's statement
uncritically. He concurred in the result-a remand for the purpose of
evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff's response-thereby indicating that
the motion itself must have been legally sufficient to "shift the burden." And
this is the way federal courts have read Celotex. Unlike the Tennessee
Supreme Court, they have not read Justice White's caveat as prohibiting the
movant from making the conclusory assertion that the nonmovant cannot
prove her case."
Indeed, the Tennessee court went on to quote the Sixth Circuit's reading
of Celotex: "the movant [can] challenge the opposing party to 'put up or shut
up' on a critical issue."' This "put up or shut up" terminology has been used
by textbook authors and others to indicate the very minimal nature of the
movant's burden under Celotex. s Merely by asserting that the nonmovant

63. Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
64. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990) ("Celotex made clear that
Rule 56 does not require the moving party to negatethe elements of the nonmoving party's case
....
");see also, e.g., Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528,532 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a summaryjudgment motion supported by the assertion that plaintiff cannot prove
her case is sufficient); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that after Anderson and Celotex, "the movant could challenge the opposing party
to 'put up or shut up' on a critical issue" and that "a party may move for summary judgment
asserting that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to
withstand a directed verdict motion"); Bingham v. Pittsburgh, 658 F. Supp. 655,657 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (holding that a motion for summary judgment was sufficient to shift the burden of
response to the plaintiff after the defendant municipality supported its motion solely with its
answer denying the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint).
65. Street, 886 F.2d at 1478.
66. See, e.g., JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS
406 (4th ed. 2001); Robert M. Bratton, Summary JudgmentPracticein the 1990s: A New Day
Has Begun-Hopefully, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 441, 477 (1991); Freeman, supra note 15, at
68; Gary W. Garner, Summary Judgment: "Put Up or Shut Up, " LITIGATION, Spring 1999, at
23. But see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 9.3, at 461 n.21 (3d ed. 1999) (asserting, without citation to Celotex, that "it is not sufficient
for the moving party merely to state a belief that no such evidence exists. The moving party,
to be successful, must establish a record by means of affidavits, depositions, interrogatories,
requests to admit, and other relevant material showing such a lack of evidentiary support.").
Although the movant's burden under Celotex may be minimal, Friedenthal, Kane, and
Miller's position may be justified by the fact that in Celotex, the movant had served the plaintiff
with interrogatories seeking information about the evidence supporting causation. These
interrogatories were never answered. In its motion for summary judgment, Celotex pointed to
the unanswered interrogatories to support its assertion that the plaintiff could produce no
evidence to prove causation. 477 U.S. at 320. Celotex's ability to point to unanswered
interrogatories may have motivated Justice White's insistence that "a conclusory assertion" of
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lacks evidence of a required element, the movant can shift the burden of
responding to the nonmovant.
Despite quoting the Sixth Circuit, the Tennessee Supreme Court obviously
read Celotex differently, indicated most clearly by the adverb correctly.67 In
one sense, the adverb is inappropriate because the Tennessee Supreme Court
is not the authority on what constitutes a correct reading of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56. In another sense, however, the court was signaling its
reluctance to adopt an interpretation of a "virtually identical" Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 that would allow a movant to do nothing more than
conclusorily assert that the nonmovant cannot prove its case. The adverb
"correctly" is the first telltale sign that Tennessee and federal summary
judgment practice are about to diverge.
After concluding its discussion of Celotex, the court moved on to a short
discussion of the third trilogy case, Matsushita.6 8 The court introduced its
discussion by noting that "the Court again affirmed summary judgment for the
defendants." 9 This emphasis on affirmance of summary judgment for the
defendants offers a clue to the earlier misreading of Celotex: perhaps the
Tennessee Supreme Court was eager to find a nonexistent symmetry of result
in the three cases. In this instance, however, the court's statement of the result
was correct. But again, its selection of quotations from Matsushita

no evidence would be insufficient to support a summary judgment motion. See id. at 328
(White, J., concurring); supranotes 31-34 and accompanying text. The plurality in Celotex said
only that "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing
out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's
case," 477 U.S. at 325, without indicating whether supporting materials would be necessary to
"show" or "point out" the lack of evidence. A careful practitioner, before filing a Celotex-type
motion, should make sure that the nonmovant's lack of evidence is adequately reflected in the
discovery documents. See generally U.S. DIST. CT. W.D. TENN. R. 7.2(dX2) ("Ifthe proponent
contends that the opponent of the motion cannot produce evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact, the proponent shall affix to the memorandum copies of the precise portions of the
record relied upon as evidence of this assertion."). If, in fact, a Celotex-type motion must be
supported by something other than a "conclusory assertion" that the nonmovant cannot prove
its case, then a Celotex-type motion cannot be a defendant's first response to a complaint, nor
can it be used in a case in which no discovery is undertaken, although, presumably, the
nonmovant's initial disclosures under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) might be enough to show its lack
of evidence.
67. The court stated that "Justice White's concurring opinion correctly places a finer point
on the Court's holding .. " Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 213; see supra note 63 and accompanying
text. To the extent the Tennessee Supreme Court read Justice White's statement as a
requirement that the movant negate an element of the nonmovant's claim, the court undoubtedly
misread Justice White's opinion. At most, his deprecation of "conclusory assertion[s]"
indicated his understanding that the movant must identify portions of the record supporting the
assertion that the nonmovant lacks evidence. See supra note 66
68. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cited in
Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 213.
69. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 213 (emphasis added).
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emphasized the nonmovant's burden: "When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."70
The court ended its discussion of federal practice by praising the 1986
trilogy as a "salutary return to the original purpose of summary judgment," 1
as "an effective case management device," '72 and as a "fast track to a
decision."" In the court's own words, "the trilogy has focused much attention
on summary judgments by breathing new life into the provisions of Rule
56."' The court continued to display ambivalence, praising the trilogy for
resurrecting summary judgment practice, while at the same time reading
Celotex in a restrictive way inconsistent with federal practice. At this point
in the opinion, it is very difficult to discern the court's message. What was
the court trying to tell us about summary judgment in Tennessee?
The next part of the opinion, "Our Findings and Conclusions,"" offered
partial, if somewhat confused, answers. Part I of this subsection is labelled
"The Proper Summary Judgment Analysis to be Applied in Tennessee." 76 The
court appears to be speaking ex cathedra here, as it still had not related the
facts of the case at bar or indicated what standard the trial court applied in
granting the summary judgment. Unfortunately, this section began with an
overstatement that reflected, perhaps, wishful thinking: "Comparison of the
state and federal caselaw construing Rule 56 to date reveals no striking
differences. The respective interpretations given the Rule are consistent in
most material respects."7 Yet, in the seven years that intervened between
Celotex and Byrd, the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts had consistently read Celotex as authorizing precisely what the
Tennessee Supreme Court claimed it did not: a conclusory assertion by the
movant that the nonmovant had no evidence to prove her case.7" The

70. Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 214 (quoting William W. Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of
Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441,451 (1992)).
73. Id. (quoting Schwarzer et al., supra note 72, at 452).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990) ("Celotex made clear
that Rule 56 does not require the moving party to negate the elements of the nonmoving party's
case.
); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that
after Anderson and Celotex, "the movant could challenge the opposing party to 'put up or shut
up' on a critical issue" and that "a party may move for summary judgment asserting that the
opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed
verdict motion"); Woelpper v. Scott Aviation, Civ. A. No. 90-5713, 1991 WL 183774, at *1
(E.D. Pa.Sept. 12, 1991) ("The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 56 as neither expressly nor
impliedly requiring the moving party to support its motion with affidavits or other similar
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Tennessee Supreme Court supported its statement by noting that "our
intermediate appellate courts have begun to approvingly cite Celotex'with
some regularity."'79 But the five cases cited by the court relied on a portion of
Celotex that did not address the movant's burden," and in none of the five
cases did the court of appeals approve an unsupported summary judgment
motion."'
To further support its assertion about the consistency of state and federal

practice, the court gave a litany of seven corresponding summary judgment
principles, two of which were as follows: "[T]he party seeking summary
judgment must carry the burden of persuading the court that no genuine and
material factual issue exists; [and] the nonmoving party must affirmatively
materials negating the opponent's claim."); Bingham v. Pittsburgh, 658 F. Supp. 655, 657
(W.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that a motion for summaryjudgment was sufficient to shift the burden
of response to the plaintiff after the defendant municipality supported its motion solely with its
answer denying the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint). But cf.Skotak v. Tenneco Resins,
Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 921 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[W]hen the record already contains evidence that
creates a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex requires a moving party to do more than simply
answer that there is no evidence of that fact, even ifthe nonmovant will bear the burden of proof
on that issue at trial.").
79. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214 n.3.
80. The following passage, which is characteristic of all five cases, demonstrates that the
court of appeals had addressed only the sufficiency of the nonmovant's response to the motion:
[S]ummary judgment shall be entered against a party who failed to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case and on
which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. If the non-moving party fails to
establish the existence of an essential element, there can be no genuine issue as to any
material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Moman v. Walden, 719 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tenn. Ct, App. 1986) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322-23); accord Goodman v. Phythyon, 803 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Laws v.
Johnson, 799 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Stanley v. Joslin, 757 S.W.2d 328,330
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Owen v. Stanley, 739 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). In only
one pre-Byrd case did the Tennessee Court of Appeals address the sufficiency of the motion;
the court cited Moman v. Walden for the proposition that a movant for summary judgment can
satisfy its burden by "demonstrat[ing] that the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential
element of its case." Caledonia Leasing & Equip. Co. v. Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman,
McBride & Prewitt, 865 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). The Tennessee Supreme Court
did not cite Caledonia Leasing in Byrd.
81. See Goodman, 803 S.W.2d at 698 (movant relied upon "the pleadings, his affidavit
and discovery depositions'); Laws, 799 S.W.2d at 251 (in pharmacist malpractice action,
motion supported by affidavits of four pharmacists); Stanley, 757 S.W.2d at 329-30 (court did
not delineate what materials were filed insupport of motion, but recited detailed facts, including
quotations from the parties, suggesting that discovery was taken); Owen, 739 S.W.2d at 785 (in
will contest, movant relied upon depositions of five of testator's relatives and three lawyers);
Moman, 719 S.W.2d at 533-34 (court did not delineate what materials were filed in support of
motion, but recited detailed facts gleaned from the "record," suggesting that discovery was
taken).
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demonstrate with specific facts that there is indeed a genuine and material
factual dispute. ... "' What the court omitted here, of course, is how the
movant may persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
thus shifting the burden of response to the nonmovant.
In a transition paragraph, the court signaled that it was not adopting the
1986 trilogy wholesale:
Today, we reaffirm the summary judgment principles found in the
Tennessee cases discussed above. We also embrace the construction of Rule
56 in Anderson, Celotex, and Matsushitato the extent discussedin the prior
section of this opinion relating to those cases. Additionally, we make the
following observations to place a finer point on the proper use of the
summary judgment process in this state.83
The court's repetition of the phrase "a finer point" is fascinating. Just as
Justice White honed "a finer point" on the United States Supreme Court's
plurality opinion, so the Tennessee court is putting "a finer point" on federal
practice for use in Tennessee state courts. Like the court's earlier assertion
of interpretive authority over the Celotex plurality opinion, this passage
implicitly acknowledges what the court refused to acknowledge explicitly:
henceforth, federal and Tennessee summary judgment practice would differ.
There follows an enumeration of general summary judgment principles,
the first three of which generally mirror those set forth earlier in the opinion.
With respect to the crucial burden-shifting aspect of Celotex, the court
announced the following as Tennessee law:
[T]he party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating to
the court that there are no disputed, material facts creating a genuine issue
for trial . . . and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is clearly
insufficient."
In a footnote to this passage, the court suggested two ways in which the
movant could carry its burden: "First, the moving party could affirmatively
negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.... ."8 5 This is the
old Adickes standard that had been noncontroversial for years. But the court
ran into trouble with the next suggestion: "Second, the moving party could
conclusively establish an affirmative defense that defeats the nonmoving
party's claim, i.e., a defendant would be entitled to summary judgment if he
demonstrated that the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element

82.
83.
84.
85.

Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 215 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 215 n.5.
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of his case. ' 6 In this sentence, the court yoked together two disparate means
of carrying the movant's burden. Establishing an affirmative defense is not,
of course, equivalent to demonstrating that "the nonmoving party cannot
establish an essential element of his case. 87
At this point in the opinion, it is clear that in Tennessee a movant for
summary judgment must present evidence that either (1) negates an element
of the nonmovant's case, or (2) establishes an affirmative defense. Because
"[a] conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is clearly
insufficient" to support a motion for summary judgment, it appears that a
movant in Tennessee cannot force the nonmovant to "put up or shut up." The
movant must present some evidence to properly support the motion for
summary judgment. This conclusion is reinforced by the court's description
of the nonmovant's burden:
When the party seeking summary judgment makes a properly supported
motion, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific
facts, not legal conclusions, by using affidavits or the discovery materials
listed in Rule 56.03, establishing that there are indeed disputed, material facts
creating a genuine issue that needs to be resolved by the trier of fact ....
"
Summing up its discussion, the court continued its ambivalent approach
toward summary judgment, saying first that "there can be no doubt that
summary judgment is a helpful device, in appropriate cases, for the just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of litigation." 9 The court also sounded a
cautionary note: "However, in order to fulfill its intended utility, Rule 56
must be properly invoked by the parties and properly applied by the courts."90
In a footnote to this passage, the court ominously warned ofdire consequences
if summary judgment is improperly used:
A factually baseless or legally untenable summary judgment motion would
certainly be subject to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 11 ....
Accordingly, filing the motion
is by no means a no-risk proposition for the defendant, who is more often
86. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
87. Id. Robert Banks and June Entman characterize the court's definition of "affirmative
defense" as "curious," noting that "[o]rdinarily, an attack on the truth or sufficiency of the
plaintiff's evidence is not considered an affirmative defense." ROBERT BANKS, JR. & JUNE F.
ENTMAN, TENNESSEE Civil, PROCEDURE § 9-4(m), at 709 n.368 (1999). Later courts have
generally understood this distinction and have not confused an affirmative defense with
negation of an element of the plaintiff's case. For a discussion of affirmative defenses, see
generally Hodge v. JonesHolding Co., No. M 1998-00955-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 873458, at
*3-*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2001). 1 am indebted to Don Paine for calling my attention to
this case.
88. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 216.
90. Id. (footnote omitted).
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than not the moving party.... Also, Rule 56.07 provides for sanctions when
an improper affidavit is submitted in support of or in opposition to the
motion.9

As in the beginning of the opinion, it appears that the problem that called for
clarification and coherence in the law was the overuse of summary judgment,
and it appears that the Tennessee Supreme Court's goal was to place limits on
the use of summary judgment.
On the final page and a half of its opinion, the court turned to
"Application to the Present Facts." 92 We learn that the plaintiff was a
radiologist, formerly employed at a hospital.9" His complaint alleged that he
was fired when the defendants, a group of physicians, tortiously interfered
with his employment by "exerting influence over the hospital's administration."
The defendants answered, raising the defense of failure to state a claim. 95
They then filed contention interrogatories, and there the case had rested for
a year. In the court's words, "The interrogatories were never answered by the
Plaintiff and the Defendants never filed a motion to compel. Other than the
Defendants' interrogatories, neither side undertook any formal discovery."96
Eight months later, however, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, again raising the defense of failure to state a claim.97 The court
noted that "[t]he motion was accompanied by a brief but without affidavits or
other supporting material.""
As Banks and Entman note in an understatement: "[I]t is difficult to see
how the motion in Byrd was anything more than... a conclusory assertion. ' 99
Now we know why the Tennessee Supreme Court was so interested in

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 216 n.7. The current version of Rule 56.07 is TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.08.
Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 216.
Id.
Id. (quoting Complaint).
Id. It is not clear why the defendants alleged that the complaint failed to state a claim.

A cause of action for tortious interference with employment had been recognized in Tennessee
prior to Byrd. Perhaps filing the motion was merely a reflex on the part of the defendants. See
Ladd v. Roane Hosiery, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1977); see also Woods v. Helmi, 758
S.W.2d 219,225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has recently
rejected the tort of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. See Nelson v.
Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1997). 1am indebted to Jerry Phillips for calling this case to
my attention.
96. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 216.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 216-17.
99. BANKS & ENTMAN, supra note 87, § 9-4(m), at 707. Interestingly, as in Celotex, the
movant in Byrd served the plaintiff with interrogatories seeking the facts underlying the
complaint, and, as in Celotex, these interrogatories were never answered. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at
216. The parties undertook no further discovery in the case. Id. In moving for summary
judgment, the defendant did not rely on the plaintiff's failure to answer the interrogatories, nor
did the supreme court assign any legal significance to this failure.
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Celotex: it had been asked to rule upon a motion that was unsupported, like
the motion in Celotex. The difference, of course, was that here, the motion
was purportedly based upon the failure to state a claim, while the motion in
Celotex was based upon the plaintiff's lack of evidence that Celotex products
caused her late husband's asbestosis. Still, Celotex (at least the plurality
opinion) held that Rule 56 does not require that motions be supported by
affidavits or discovery materials. Thus, if the issue in Byrd were the
sufficiency of the motion for summary judgment, Celotex would be the most
relevant federal case.
However, the court did not frame the issue as the sufficiency of the
motion. Instead, the court focused on the sufficiency of the plaintiffs
response. In response to the unsupported motion, the plaintiff had filed his
own affidavit, which set forth specific "incidents" in which the physicians
interfered with his duties. The court quoted eight paragraphs of the affidavit
in a footnote." ° Despite the plaintiffs submission of this affidavit, the trial
court had granted summaryjudgment and the court of appeals had affirmed."0 '
Clearly resting its reversal of the summary judgment on the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs response to the motion, the supreme court held, "Plaintiff as the
nonmoving party, set forth specific facts in paragraphs 6 through 9 of his
affidavit. ...Those allegations, if taken as true, create genuine issues of
material fact."'0 2 Thus, the court failed to say anything at all about the
sufficiency of the defendants' motion, and instead relied entirely upon the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's response. In some sense, this holding is an
anticlimax. After having declared its intention to clarify Tennessee summary
judgment law, the court failed to apply its meticulously crafted version of the
federal precedents that it had presented as important to its project.'0 3 Despite
the hints, outlined above, that Tennessee summary judgment law would depart
from the standards announced in the 1986 trilogy, by the end of the Byrd

100. Byrd, 847S.W.2dat217n.8.
101. Id.at 217.
102. Id. The court also quoted from the defendants' brief in support of their motion: "[I]f
[the incidents] took place, which has not been proven, [they] were necessary and proper...."
Id.Holding implicitly that the events related in the plaintiff's affidavit stated a cause of action
under Tennessee law, the court noted that "[t]he parties' basic disagreement as to whether these
incidents even occurred at all raises genuine issues of material fact." Id.
103. Because the motion in Byrd was unsupported by evidentiary materials, the case
presented a perfect opportunity for the court to explicitly disavow the Celotex plurality's
standard. If the court had held that the motion itself was insufficient, the result-reversal and
remand-would have been the same. If the court wished to duck the Celotex issue altogether,
postponing consideration of the 1986 trilogy to another day, the sufficiency of the plaintiffs
response would have provided a perfect out. But the court's holding seems to be the worst of
both worlds: it neither applies the Celotex standard it purports to adopt, nor does it duck the
issue by relying on the plaintiff's response. By apparently adopting a new standard that it then
fails to apply, the court ran the risk that its pronouncements about Celotex would be seen as
dicta, or as "advisory opinion[s]." Entman, supra note 6, at 219.
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opinion we are still unsure how Tennessee summary judgment law has
changed, if at all.
So is Byrd a bad decision?
IV. Gossip
Byrd suffers from a number of weaknesses: (1) it purports to clarify and
bring coherence to Tennessee summaryjudgment law without identifying the
existing problems with that law; (2) it seems ambivalent about the desirability
of summary judgment, hinting both that it is overused and that it is underused;
(3) it purports to adopt a view of summary judgment law that is consistent
with federal law while in fact adopting a more restrictive view than the federal
law; (4) it does more than it has to do to decide the case; it does not apply the
law it adopts; the issue presented in the case could have been (and, in fact, is)
decided without resort to the new law the court adopts; and (5) itjust flat gets
the procedural facts wrong in its discussion of Celotex. Any of these
weaknesses might qualify Byrd as a bad decision.
Oddly, despite these weaknesses, there has been little scholarly critique
of Byrd v. Hall. ° June Entman has criticized Byrd as an example of "flawed
activism.""'° She notes the court's erroneous description of the procedural
history and holding of Celotex, and she explains that the court's purported
approval of Celotex is "ambiguous."'" Ultimately, she notes, the case is
nothing more than an advisory opinion because the court's holding rested not
on the sufficiency of the movant's showing, but on the sufficiency of the
nonmovant's response."0 7 She concludes that "the court provided a confusing
discussion of Celotex, resolved the case before it on an unrelated ground, and
missed the opportunity to clarify other important issues that the case actually
presented."' '
As Peter Goodrich points out, legal discourse is "hierarchical (stratified),
authoritarian (distanced), [and] monologic (uniaccentual)."'"' Byrd v. Hall,
like any published Tennessee Supreme Court opinion, participates in the
hierarchical structure and authoritarian power of the legal system from which
the opinion emerges." Only a court atop the state's judicial hierarchy could

104. Commentary on Byrd includes BANKS& ENTmAN, supra note 87, § 9-4(m), at 705-09;
A. PrVNICK, TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE § 27.5, at 858-59, 867-68 n.38
(4th ed. 1995); Entman, supra note 6, at 218; James H. Nixon III, Note, Civil
Procedure-Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56-Clarified Procedure for Summary
Judgment, 61 TENN. L. REV. 375 (1993).
105. Entman, supra note 6, at 193.
106. Id. at218.
107. Id. at 220.
108. Id. at 226.
LAWRENCE

109. PETERGOODRICH, LEGALDISCOURSE: STUDIES INLINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 3 (1987).

110.

See id. at 170-71.
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make the sweeping declaration that it intends to clarify and bring coherence
to summary judgment law. Only the highest court of the state can purport to
affect an entire area of law with one decision. Even the court's rehearsal of
the history of summary judgment law partakes of the court's hierarchical
privilege of taking a God's-eye view of the law, by transforming its own
interpretation of history into precedent.
Characteristic of the authoritarian nature of legal discourse is hidden
prescription. Prescriptive statements are disguised as declarations: what must
be done is described as what is done. A court commands simply by
describing: "Although the statement is intended to explain and control
specific behaviour, it lacks any directive speech act.... [T]here is no explicit
command structure, no request or imperative from a speaker to an addressee,
but rather a familiar legal objectification. . . .'"" A delightful example of
hidden prescription in Byrd is the court's talisman that "[a] conclusory
assertion that the'nonmoving party has no evidence is clearly insufficient."' 2
Notice that the court uses a state-of-being verb, "is," to express what is
essentially a command: "Do not file summary judgment motions that do no
more than conclusorily assert that the nonmoving party has no evidence."
Our recognition that the declarative statement can be transformed into the
imperative command challenges the "self presentation of legal language as
unitary, and the correlative exclusion of dialogue,""' 3 because a command
must have an audience. Legal discourse has at least three audiences: "the
legal profession, the litigants, and the public."' "'4 As any practicing attorney
will tell you, the court is a speaker, and attorneys listen to its commands,
responding with various court filings that incorporate the court's statements,
but at the same time use, interpret, and manipulate those statements in an
effort to elicit yet more-and, perhaps, different-commands from the court.
Thus, every opinion has both an implied audience-the one imagined by the
court-and a real audience, including those attorneys who mold their behavior
to the commands of the court. This observation may be especially true for
Byrd v. Hall because the court undertook a self-conscious process of
clarification, hinting at inadequacies in prior practice, and evidently hoping
to be heeded by the bar as a whole (not just by the attorneys and litigants in
the case). In addition, the court hoped to receive responses from attorneys in
the form of reformed practice, though undoubtedly the court's invitation was
limited to obedient responses; the court cannot be read as inviting lively
critiques of its commands. Thus it maintains its hierarchical position with
respect to the bar.
With respect to the United States Supreme Court, however, the Tennessee
Ill1.Id. at 18 1.

112. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215.
113. GOODRICH, supra note 109, at 175.
114. Id. at 117. However, as Frederick Schauer has pointed out, the public is probably not
an actual audience for ajudicial opinion. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. ClI. L.
REv. 1455, 1463 (1995).
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court falters. The court's inaccurate reading of Celotex opens a fissure in the
unitary surface of the opinion. With respect to pronouncements within its
sphere of authority-Tennessee legal history and practice-the court is
magisterial. Yet, when it begins talking about an even more authoritative
institution, the United States Supreme Court, the court makes what can only
be described as a novice error: it misreads the opinion. How can we account
for this slippage?
We can see the court, in these erroneous passages, slipping into gossip,
one of the lowest forms of discourse. In her book, Gossip, Patricia Meyer
Spacks defines gossip as "idle talk about other persons not present.""' 5 Gossip
always involves (at least) a triad: the two talkers and the one talked about." 6
Indeed, in Byrd, the court's impulse to "talk about" rather than to decide, is
fully on display. As June Entman puts it, the opinion can be described as "a
law review-type treatise on a broad topic"" 7 instead of an "[a]pplicaton of
chosen rules to the case at bar."' 8
As Spacks points out, the talkers are frequently subordinate to the talkedabout; often, gossip is the speech of the powerless about the powerful." 9 It
is the resource of the "situationally deprived."' 2 If we see the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Byrd as "situationally deprived" vis i vis the United States
Supreme Court, both the dialogic character and the strange incoherencies of
the opinion make more sense. The Byrd court's reading of Celotex constitutes
the Tennessee court gossiping with its bar about an absent, more powerful
institution. Of course, the United States Supreme Court is not hierarchically
superior or more powerful than the Tennessee Supreme Court in matters of
Tennessee law, but the court's own presentation of summary judgment law
seems to grant authority to the United States SupremeCourt. For example,
the court noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 are "virtually identical,"' 2 and the court boasted that its
decision would make Tennessee law "consistent" with federal law.'22 As we
have seen, this particular claim--that Tennessee summary judgment law is
now consistent with federal summary judgment law-is unwarranted, but
what is true is that the Tennessee court in Byrd remade Celotex for its own

115.

PATRICIA MEYERSPACKS, Gossip 26 (1985). The term "gossip" often carries negative

connotations for "its circulation of slander, its betrayal of secrets, its penetration of privacy."
Id. at 33. It can be defined as "[rjumor or talk of a personal, sensational, or intimate nature."
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG11SH LANGuAGE 783 (3d ed. 1992). By

using the term "gossip" to characterize portions of the Byrd opinion, I do not intend to ascribe
these negative connotations to the opinion.
116.

SPACKS, supra note 115, at 57, 83.

117.
118.

Entrnan, supra note 6, at 226.
Id. at227.

119.

See SPACKS, supranote 115, at5, 15,57, 103.

120.
121.

Id. at 209.
Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993).

122.

Id. at 214.
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ends. By insisting on Justice White's concurrence and by co-opting the
United States Supreme Court's authority in the service of its own more
restrictive reading of Celotex, the Tennessee court's discourse partakes of
gossip.
As Spacks points out, "Bakhtin's account of dialogue" applies to the way
in which gossip functions: "An active understanding, one that assimilates the
word under consideration into a new conceptual system, that of the one trying
to understand, establishes a series of complex interrelationships, consonances
and dissonances with the word and enriches it with new elements."' 23 In other
words, the Tennessee court, one of the actual audiences for the United States
Supreme Court's Celotex decision, "assimilates" it into its own "conceptual
system" of summary judgment practice and, in the retelling of it to the
Tennessee bar, "establishes a series of complex interrelationships,
consonances and dissonances with the [opinion] and enriches it with new
elements." An example of this process is the artificial symmetry created by
the court: by misreading Celotex as an affirmance of a summary judgment,
the court transformed the 1986 trilogy into a univocal chorus of approval for
summary judgments. Through its rhetorical power, the Tennessee Supreme
Court manufactured coherence between Tennessee and federal practice and
among the federal precedents themselves.
The transformative power of gossip suggested by Bakhtin reminds us that
the gossiper must have some status vis i vis the gossiped-about. As Spacks
puts it,

It is a paradox essential to gossip that those who engage in it must in the
process combine the roles of insider and outsider. Indeed, that combination
generates one of gossip's most powerful appeals. The person who talks
about others must belong to their world enough to know what is going on;
but the gossip speaks, often, as one judging from the position of outside
observer.' 2'
This paradox obviously applies to the Tennessee Supreme Court's use of
Celotex; the court is an "insider" to the judicial system as a whole, but an
"outside observer" with respect to United States Supreme Court precedent
because it is not bound by it and can indeed pass judgment on its usefulness
for Tennessee practice. Less obviously, however, this paradox applies to this
very Article, which can itself be seen as gossip. Although this Article is
produced by an author who is an "insider" to the legal system (an attorney
licensed in Tennessee, a law professor at a Tennessee law school), neither the
author nor her Article has any socially constructed authority in the legal
system. This Article is no more than the speech of the powerless about the
powerful, the judgment of an "outside observer."
123. SPACKS, supra note 15, at 21 (quoting M.M. BAKHTIN,THEDLALOGI
280 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Hoiquist trans., 198 1)).
124. Id. at 212.
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Of course, this assessment assumes that the only audience for this Article
is other academics and lawyers, not the courts themselves. Butjudges do read
law review articles. Indeed, they sometimes refer to law review articles in
their opinions'25 and, occasionally, use an article as a guide for their
decisions. 26 This Article can gain authority within the legal system if it is
adopted or incorporated into a court's legal discourse. Still, the fact that the
Article's authority derives entirely from its "adoption" by the court constitutes
a persistent sign of its author's relatively subordinate status in the legal
hierarchy.
Recognizing another way of thinking about the relationship of legal
academics and the judiciary, Judge Kenneth Ripple has described the
academic lawyer as the 'intellectual watchdog' of the judiciary."' 27 He
asserts that there is a "public[] interest in a robust and uninhibited critique of
the judicial work product."' 28 He also suggests that "academic critique of the
judicial work product is a function of constitutional dignity and worthy of the
special respect we accord such a function." '29 In Judge Ripple's view, legal
academicians and judges are partners in an "ongoing dialogue."' 3 ° Ironically,
while the judge's rhetoric assigns academic lawyers an exalted status in the
legal hierarchy, his reference to "dialogue" returns us to the idea of gossip.
But if thejudiciary and the legal academy' 3' or, in other words,judges and law
professors"' are talking, whom or what are they talking about? In the most
elementary terms, we are talking about the court itself, or at least, one of the
court's decisions. Thus, it would seem, a legal academic and a court cannot
really gossip with one another through a law review article because the subject
of the gossip is the court itself. But Judge Ripple suggests that the subject of
our gossip is something quite different: "the values at the core of our legal
*system."' 33 To the extent this Article considers issues of coherence, fairness,
and the transformative power of legal rhetoric, perhaps it exemplifies a

125. E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 336 (2001) (citing Thomas Y.
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547 (1999)).
126. See, e.g.,United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822,829 n.6 (2001)
(citing Don Leatherman, Current Developments for Consolidated Groups, 486 PLI/TAX 389
(2000)); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Carol A. Mutter,
Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57
TENN. L. REv. 199 (1990)).
127. Kenneth F. Ripple, Judges on Judging: The Judge and the Academic Community,
50 O-o ST. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1989).
128. Id. at 1240.
129. Id. at 1239.
130. Id.

131.

Note here that I have used abstract nouns, characteristic of the "high" discourse of the

law

132. Here I am using concrete, though still collective, nouns more suitable to the "low"
discourse of gossip.
133.

Ripple, supra note 127, at 1239.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69:175

species of dialogue between the legal academy and the judiciary.
If a legal academician can gossip with judges via law review articles, then
what is happening when ajudge authors an article? One of the most readable
articles on summary judgment is Judge Patricia Wald's Summary Judgment
at Sixty.134 In it, she addresses the history of summary judgment, the 1986
trilogy, and its effect on D.C. Circuit summary judgment law.' 35 This article
can only be described as, well, gossipy.136 The history of summary judgment
rehearsed by Judge Wald is almost entirely the history of two personalities:
Judge Charles Clark and Judge Jerome Frank, for whom Judge Wald served
as law clerk.'37 In Judge Wald's narrative, the history boils down to a
dialogue between the two judges about the proper role of summary
judgment. 38
It is clear that the article itself has an imagined, as well as an actual,
audience and that Judge Wald is inviting a dialogue with her audiences in the
same way that the court in Byrd invited a dialogue with its audiences. There
are two obvious implied audiences for Judge Wald's article: the first, and
most impressionable, is the plaintiff's bar. She liberally laces the article with
statements about what plaintiffs must expect given the D.C. federal courts'
summary judgment practice. For example, she writes, "The lesson taught by
our recent caselaw is that plaintiffs generally must be prepared to put up a
good fight to resist summaryjudgment, offering sound evidentiary backing for

134. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897 (1998); see also
infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
135. See id.
136. There must be something about sunmary judgment that incites gossip. The only
recent article in the Tennessee Bar Journal devoted to summaryjudgment is cast as a scene in
a bar between an (apparently) more experienced male attorney and an (apparently) less
experienced female attorney. The female attorney seeks advice about an upcoming hearing on
her summaryjudgment motion (she represents the employer in an age discrimination case), and
the male attorney advises her that she has a good chance of prevailing because, contrary to the
hornbook law, thejudge must weigh the evidence in deciding a summaryjudgment motion. The
title of the article is (if you can believe it) "The Dirty Little Secret About Summary Judgment."
Robert L. Arrington, The Dirty Little Secret About Summary Judgment, 32 TENN. B.J. Sept.Oct. 1996, at 12. Thus, the article frames its characters as gossiping, not just about the
particular case that the female attorney mentions, but about the larger principles of summary
judgment law. All the indicia of gossip are present: two persons talking about an absent third
(the trial judge who will hear the motion, the Tennessee court system as a whole) from a
position of situational deprivation (the female lawyer is situationally deprived vis i vis the male
lawyer, while both lawyers are situationally deprived vis A vis the court system since their
clients' fates rest in the hands ofjudges, whom theymust both please and manipulate), and from
the position of both insider and outsider (both are lawyers, and thus inside the system, but their
outsider status is marked by the necessity of one lawyer's disclosing to the other the "secret"
he has discovered).
137. Wald, supra note 134, at 1898-1904.
138. Id.
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their claims almost simultaneously with the filing of their complaints."' 39
Again,
The moral [in Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transportation, Inc.] seems to be that
regardless of Rule 8, a plaintiffs complaint must contain a substantially
detailed (and thus, probably not terribly short) statement of his case with
enough facts and issues to survive the equivalent of a motion for summary
judgment. The plaintiff may not get another chance to make his case. 40
Finally, "After the Matsushita/Anderson/Celotextriology, plaintiffs must have
their factual ducks in a row if they hope to hold off early motions to dismiss;
they cannot rely on post-complaint discovery to line them up later."''
Although each of these statements is a declarative sentence, describing what
"is," what "seems to be," and what "must" occur, they clearly constitute
advice to those representing plaintiffs in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. Like the hidden legal prescriptions of judicial
opinions,'42 however, the implied imperatives ("Be ready to offer sound
evidentiary backing for your claim when you file your complaint"; "Give a
detailed statement of your case in the complaint"; and "Do not count on
having time to conduct discovery to uncover the facts necessary to resist
summary judgment") are disguised. Thus, like judges writing in the
institutionally sanctioned, authoritative genre of the opinion, Judge Wald
recognizes that her position within the systenm--her extra-article authority as
judge-will make her audience receptive to her advice, disguised as it is.
A second audience for Judge Wald's article is her fellowjudges, including
both her colleagues on the D.C. Circuit and the judges of the United States
District Court. For this audience-which, of course, is much less receptive
to her message because they are less subordinate to her in the institutional
hierarchy' 4 3-her statements are less cautionary, less advisory, and more
biting. For example, "As a general matter, many of our judges seem
determined to get rid of dubious-looking cases at the early stages . ..."'
139. Id. at 1926.
140. Id. at 1935 (citing Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 82 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
141. Id.at 1942.
142. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
143. While the federal district courts are "lower" than the Circuit Courts of Appeals inthe
judicial hierarchy,the judges of the district courts are not really subordinate to the judges of the
appellate court. True, they must follow the law declared by the "higher" court, but see Evan H.
Caminker, Precedent to Prediction. The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking,73 TEx. L. REV.1 (1994) (advocating a model of lower court decisionmaking
that permits a court to predict how a higher court would decide the case), but an individual
judge of the circuit court has no real power over an individual judge of the district court, except
to the extent, perhaps, that the appellate judge sits on a panel reviewing the district judge's
ruling and persuades her colleagues to reverse. Becausejudges on all levels reportedly hate to
be reversed, this power is not an insignificant one.
144. Wald, supra note 134, at 1926.
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Again, "A few examples of cases in which nonmovants have foundered are
illustrative of the 'caveat nonmovant' mood that appears to prevail in some
courtrooms nowadays with respect to summary judgment."' 45 Another
example: "Aka and Paquin are illuminating in showing how, sixty years after
the introduction of Rule 56, circuit judges are still fighting over the most basic
aspects of summary judgment, namely what amount and kind of evidence does
a nonmovant have to show to... beat his way forward to trial.' 46 Yet again,
"This unseemly rush to summary judgment may cause the legal profession,
and the public at large, to conclude that disfavored plaintiffs are apt to be
hustled out of the courthouse."' 47 And, most biting of all, analogizing the
district judge to Macbeth: "On the principle that '[i]f it were done when 'tis
done, then 'twere well/ It were done quickly,' the district court in Marshall
County disposed of the case, not under Rule 56, but on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss."' 48 Judge Wald appears to be urging her fellow judges to temper
their overzealous practices in granting summary judgment too liberally.
Indeed, her thesis is that "we are now at a stage where the focus should be on
ensuring that summary judgment stays within its proper boundaries, rather
than on encouraging its unimpeded growth."' 49 Certainly, while the bar plays
an important role in shaping summary judgment jurisprudence, not just
through the arguments they make, but also through their actual practice of
deciding when to seek summary judgment, the "we" here discloses that Judge
Wald is speaking to judges, those who can most directly keep summary
judgment "within its proper boundaries."' 5 0
Still, given the almost playful tone of her remarks quoted above, it is
difficult to believe that Judge Wald is speaking primarily to her fellowjudges;
instead, it seems more likely that she is gossiping about them. At one point,
having asserted that the D.C. Circuit rarely reverses summary judgments "on
the ground that genuine issues of material fact existed,"' 5 ' she qualifies her
statement in a footnote by quoting District Judge Royce C. Lamberth: "[The
D.C. C]ircuit does not like district judges very much and reverses us all the
time for granting summary judgment."' 2 This is delicious stuff. Indeed, the
colloquial tone of the entire article, illustrated by the quotes above, and by
others (for example, "After Kimberlin, a plaintiff had a tough row to hoe if he

145. Id. at 1926-27.
146. Id. at 1930.
147. Id. at 1938. The legal profession and the public at large are two of the implied
audiences for judicial opinions.
148. Id. at 1933 (quoting WILIAM SHAKESPEARE, THETRAGEDYOFMACBETH act 1, sc.7)

(footnote omitted).
149. Id. at 1917.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1939.
152. Id. at 1939 n.272 (quoting Colloquium, Proceedingsofthe Sixth Annual Robert C.
Byrd Conference on the Administrative Process, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 251, 261 (1996)).
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wanted to show that a government official had it in for him.""') suggests that,
just as the Tennessee Supreme Court gossiped about the United States
Supreme Court to its bar, Judge Wald is gossiping with the D.C. plaintiffs' bar
about the hard row they have to hoe in the D.C. federal courts. Judge Wald's
pervasive use of the first-person pronoun, "we," to refer tojudges generally,5 4
to the judges of the D.C. Circuit,' or to the members of a panel,5 6 and the
"our circuit" to refer to the D.C. Circuit,' positions her, like the gossip, both
inside and outside the circle of those spoken about.'58 She is indisputably an
insider when describing her own views of the precedents, especially those in
which she participated, but she is an outsider by virtue of the platform from
which she speaks-the law review article versus the judicial opinion. By
setting her remarks within a different social institution, she is able to say
things, and say them in a way, that she would never have been able to in an
opinion. If, as June Entman claims, the Byrd opinion is little more than a law
review article,"' perhaps this freedom, this playfulness, this ability to gossip
with those who will listen about those who will not explains the court's
attraction to the form.
Of course, the Byrd court achieved nothing like the gossipy tone Judge Wald
adopts in her article. But neither does the Tennessee Supreme Court suffer from
the frustrations that may have motivated Judge Wald's tone. Unlike Judge Wald,
whose influence on the development of summary judgment law in her court is
limited, the Tennessee Supreme Court makes the summary judgment law of
Tennessee. Therefore, as we will see in the next part, the most salient audiences
for Byrd v. Hall, the lower courts and the bar, are also its most attentive.

153.
154.

Id. at 1923.
Id. at 1917.

155.

Id. at 1939.

156.
157.

Id. at 1929.
Id. at 1930-31.

158. But in what sense can Judge Wald be described as "situationally deprived"? As a
member of the "liberal wing" of the notoriously polarized D.C. Circuit, she certainly could have
been discouraged by the twelve years of Republican presidencies between 1981 and 1993, years
that saw 11 Republican appointments to the D.C. Circuit, including Robert Bork, Antonin
Scalia, Kenneth Starr, and Clarence Thomas. It undoubtedly became more difficult during those
years for her views to command amajority, even of apanel. See Patricia M. Wald,.. . Doctor,
Lawyer, Merchant, Chief, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1127, 1128 (1992) (noting dichotomy
between liberal and conservative judges). Butsee HarryT. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335 (1998) (refuting claims that D.C. Circuit
decisions can be explained by ideology ofjudges). In 1991, "two-thirds of the court had been
appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush." Wald, supra, at 1128. By 1998, after five years
of a Democratic administration and three Democratic appointments to the D.C. Circuit, six of
the thirteen active judges on the court, including Judge Wald, had been nominated by
Democratic Presidents. Still, certainly with respect to the United States Supreme Court, whose
majority was still made up of Republican appointees in 1998, Judge Wald's views were out of
favor. See id. at 1150 (noting influence of "distinctly conservative Supreme Court").
159.

Entman, supra note 6, at 226.
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V. RECEPTION HISTORY
A. Introduction
Another way to decide whether Byrd v. Hall is a bad decision is to look
at its reception history. The reception history of a work focuses on its
"consumption,""° how it has been used, analyzed, and critiqued by its readers.
As Jerome McGann has shown, a literary "work"'' has "two interlocking
histories, one that derives from the author's expressed decisions and purposes,
and the other that derives from the critical reactions of the [work's] various
readers."'" 2 The work, once used, analyzed, and critiqued, can no longer be
read in isolation, as a "pure" creation. For example, the statement that Byrd
v. Hall is the "seminal summary judgment case in Tennessee" is a statement
about its reception history. What makes the case seminal is its later use, both
by the courts of appeals and by the Tennessee Supreme Court itself.163
Of all the disciplines, perhaps, law (or, at least, Anglo-American law) is
most familiar with the concept of a reception history. The concepts of
precedent and stare decisis mean that we pay attention not only to the text of
statutes and cases themselves, but also to how subsequent legislatures, courts,
and even commentators have interpreted those works. Indeed, an annotated
code includes as its primary feature the reception histories of the statutes that
it reprints. Legal readers understand the importance of reading any legal text
only in light of its reception history. 6' A fully self-conscious legal analysis
must distinguish between a work's two interlocking histories-the story of its
origination 16' and the story of its reception. Thus, my earlier close reading of

160. JEROME J. MCGANN, THE BEAUTY OF INFLECTIONS 115 n.3 (1988).
161. Id. at 5. McGann distinguishes between the "work" and the "text," which he defines
as an "autonomous system of verbal signs." Id.
162. Id. at 24. Although McGann is speaking primarily of poems, his conceptual
framework is applicable to any literary genre.
163. Another example, which may make this point clearer, is Shakespeare's The Merchant
of Venice. It is impossible to think about this play without also thinking about its reception
history as an arguably anti-Semitic work.
164. This point may seem obvious or unremarkable (of course, the importance of a case
or statute depends on how it is later used and interpreted), but legal scholars may take a legal
work's reception history for granted. The importance of reception history is illustrated by the
recent efforts to create one in the courts for 18 U.S.C. § 3501. Compare Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452,457 n.* (1994) ("We also note that the Government has not sought to rely in this
case on 18 U.S.C. § 3501,... and we therefore decline the invitation of some amici to consider
it.") and id. at 463-63 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "the provision has been studiously
avoided by every Administration, not only in this Court but in the lower courts, since its
enactment more than 25 years ago"), with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,431 (2000)
(holding that § 3501 did not legislatively overrule Miranda). I am indebted to Dwight Aarons
for his observations on the checkered history of § 3501.
165. The material origins and transmission of a legal text-what McGann refers to as its
"textual" history, MCGANN, supra note 160, at 7-is frequently investigated in the case of
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Byrd v. Hall,treating it as a text, can be said to be false, or at least incomplete,
because I discussed the opinion in isolation from its interpretation and use by
later courts and commentators. And my analysis itself becomes part of the
decision's reception history, helping to mold how others think of it.
Of course, Byrd v. Hall is a part of the reception history of Celotex,just
as Celotex is part of the reception history of Adickes. 6 6 The Byrd court's
treatment of Celotex clearly demonstrates the ambiguity of that decision, the
way it can be viewed either as sanctioning unsupported motions for summary
judgment or as requiring support by evidentiary materials. Indeed, an entire
law review article could be written about the reception of Celotex by state
courts.167 How many states have accepted the plurality's view and how many
have adopted the "finer point" put on the decision by Justice White's
concurrence? How many have ignored the decision altogether? Even more
important, the so-called "1986 trilogy" exists only by virtue of the reception
of those decisions. The United States Supreme Court did not decide a "1986
statutes; annotated codes also carry indices to this history. But the textual history of a case is
rarely the topic of commentary. In fact, accounts of the sociomaterial origins of court opinions
are often seen as unethical and slightly salacious. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Matter of
Ethics: Open Chambers?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1435 (1999) (reviewing EDWARD LAZARUS,
CLOSED CHAMBERS (1998)); George Anastaplo, Legal Realism, The New Journalism,and The
Brethren, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1045 (reviewing BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN (1979)). Interestingly, George Anastaplo deprecates Woodward and Armstrong's
reliance on confidential sources and unpublished documents, classifying them as "gossip." Id.
at 1050, 1055. Because, in his view, "[t]he Court's published opinions are what matter," id. at
1054, revelation of this sociomaterial context of the opinions "promote[s] second-guessing
about what the Court intends by the opinions" and leads to "[a] kind of anarchy," id. at 1055.
Although a textual history of Byrd v. Hall might explain some of the apparent incoherencies of
that opinion, I have not attempted such a history here.
166. In Judge Wald's view, "only the result in Adickes seemed intact" after the 1986
trilogy. Wald, supranote 134, at 1912.
167. Interestingly, there appears to be no general survey of the reception of Celotex or the
1986 trilogy generally among state courts, nor is there an American Law Reports annotation on
this topic. There is commentary addressing the reception of Celotex in individual states. See,
e.g., Paul J. Cleary, Summary Judgment in Oklahoma: Suggestions for Improving a
"Disfavored" Procedure, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 251 (1994); Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr.,
Summary Judgment in Rhode Island: Is it Time to Wrap the Mantra in Celotex?, 2 ROGER
WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 153 (1997); Charles T. Frazier, Jr. et al., Celotex Comes to Texas: NoEvidence Summary Judgments and OtherRecent Developments in Summary Judgment Practice,
32 TEX. TECH L. REV. I11 (2000); David F. Johnson, The No-Evidence Motionfor Summary
Judgment in Texas, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 929 (2000); Thomas Kallay, Managing the Burdens
Imposed on Motionsfor Summary Judgment in California: The 1992 and 1993 Amendments
to CCP 437C, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39 (2000); Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary
Judgment: A Proposalfor ProceduralReform in the Core Motion Context, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1633 (1995) (Virgina); Mark Tatum & William Norris, III, Summary Judgment and
PartialJudgment in Louisiana: The State We're In, 59 LA. L. REV. 131 (1998); Gregory A.
Gordillo, Note, Summary Judgment and Problemsin Applying the Celotex Trilogy Standard,
42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 263 (1994) (Ohio).
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trilogy." It decided three summary judgment cases--one in March 168 and two
others in June. 69 Clearly, the Court tried to influence the reception of its
decisions by citing in Celotex to the other two decisions," 0 but what has made
the "1986 trilogy" and, especially, Celotex famous is the status given the cases
by other courts and by commentators.
B. Commentary on Celotex
Indeed, the commentary on Celotex provides a lesson in the importance
of chronology in reception history. In the first major article on the 1986
trilogy, Jeffrey Stempel, in 1988, wrote that the trilogy represented "an ode
to the wonders of summary judgment."''
Although it was too early to
undertake an empirical study of the effect of the trilogy, Stempel opined that
the Supreme Court's new enthusiasm for summary judgment was already
"making summary judgment easier to obtain and involving trial judges in
more activities that look suspiciously like pretrial factfinding."' 2 In the next
major article, Samuel Issacharoff and George Loewenstein, in 1990, agreed
with Stempel that the 1986 trilogy "eased the initial burden placed on the
party moving for summary judgment by permitting a summary judgment
movant to prevail without having to establish fully the nonexistence of
material facts in dispute."'7 Based on an analysis of 192 federal summary
judgment decisions, Issacharoff and Loewenstein concluded that the trilogy
had resulted in "a widespread and dramatic recasting of summary judgment
doctrine by the lower courts."' 7 4 Issacharoff and Loewenstein were more
specific about the winners and losers in the wake of the trilogy: "[T]he
increased availability of summary judgment alters the balance of power
between plaintiffs and defendants in the pretrial phases of litigation by raising
both the costs and risks to plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage while
diminishing both for defendants."' 7 5

168. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
169. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986).
170. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319, 323.
171. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A DistortedMirror. The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 106
(1988).

172. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
173. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 79 (1990).

174. Id. at 88.
175. Id. at 93. The costs are increased by requiring the plaintiff to establish what amounts
to a full blown case at the summaryjudgment stage. Not all plaintiffs are equally disadvantaged,
however. Plaintiffs with relatively fewer financial resources are disproportionately disadvantaged
vis Avis relatively wealthier plaintiffs. I am indebted to Jerry Phillips and Deseriee Kennedy for
their observations on this point.
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These observations by academics were validated eight years later in Judge
Patricia Wald's article, Summary Judgment at Sixty." She agreed that the
1986 trilogy "radically changed the Rule 56 landscape"177 by "promot[ing]
summary judgment from a housekeeping device for picking up obviously
unworthy cases to a major option to be encouraged, or even pushed, in all
kinds of disputes, large and small, even in some involving factual
controversies."' 7" Judge Wald pointed out that trial courts, impressed with the
Supreme Court's approval of relaxed standards for movants and tougher
standards for nonmovants, saw the trilogy as an "invitation... to 'go forth,
and grant summaryjudgment." 7 9 Reviewing a number ofsummaryjudgment
cases from the district courts and the D.C. Circuit, she found a "rush to
summary judgment."'8 ° Like Issacharoff and Loewenstein, Judge Wald
clearly perceived an anti-plaintiffbias in the summary judgmentjurisprudence
spawned by the trilogy. In colorful language, she concluded that "summary
judgment has spread swiftly through the underbrush of undesirable cases,
taking down some healthy trees as it goes."' 81 Apparently hoping to influence
both the bar and her fellow judges,8 2 Judge Wald counseled caution in
invoking and applying Rule 56: "[W]e are now at a stage where the focus
should be on ensuring that summary judgment stays within its proper
boundaries, rather than on encouraging its unimpeded growth."'8 3
Most recently, in 2000, United States District Judge Bernice Donald,
writing originally in the Memphis Bar Association magazine, 1 4 noted the
same enthusiasm for summary judgment deplored by Judge Wald. Speaking
primarily to lawyers, Judge Donald complained that Celotex's relaxed
standard for movants has motivated some lawyers to move for summary
judgment "while ignoring available evidence which clearly and obviously
creates a genuine issue of material fact."' 85 Noting the lack of efficiency
created by attorneys' overzealous use of Rule 56, Judge Donald lamented the
fact that even a non-meritorious motion "requires the opposing attorney to
prepare and file a response and then requires the court to take the time to
evaluate the motions and pore through what is frequently an extensive record
of depositions, affidavits, and pleadings."'8 6 Judge Donald has obviously

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

76 TEx. L. REv. 1897 (1998).
Id. at 1907.
Id. at 1913.
Id. at 1926.
Id. at 1940.
Id. at 1941.
See supra notes 135-37, 141 and accompanying text.
Wald, supra note 176, at 1917.
Bernice B. Donald&WilliamC. Plouffe, Jr., The Summary Judgment Process: When

the Solution Becomes Part of the Problem, 194 F.R.D. 262 (2000), reprinted from THE
MEMPus LAWYER, Dec. 1999.

185.
186.

Id. at 267.
Id. at 266.
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become impatient with these abusive summary judgment motions; she warned
that Rule 11 sanctions would be appropriate for attorneys who allege that the
facts are "undisputed" when disputed facts are "clearly and obviously
available to the moving attorney prior to the filing of the motion."'8 7 Judge
Donald's article suggests that the Celotex chickens have come home to
roost. ' From a defendant's standpoint, it seems, the ability to file an
unsupported summary judgment motion,"8 9 thereby shifting the burden of
production to the plaintiff, carries enough benefits to justify the attorney in
mischaracterizing the record before the court. From Stempel's perception that
the 1986 trilogy would make summary judgment easier, to Judge Donald's
complaints about summary judgment motions that ignore disputed facts
already in the record, we can see an arc of experience that justifies Judge
Wald's call for caution and restraint in Rule 56 practice. 9 0
C. McCarley v. West Quality Food Service
The reception history of Byrd v. Hall inscribes no such arc. As noted
earlier, there is very little scholarly commentary on the decision. Therefore,
the reception history of Byrd v. Hall is found primarily in court decisions.
The most important case interpreting Byrd is the Tennessee Supreme Court's
1998 decision inMcCarleyv. West QualityFood Service.'9 ' InMcCarley,the
court left no doubt that it really meant what it had said in Byrd. Mr. McCarley
sued the operator of a Kentucky Fried Chicken, alleging that he had been

187.

Id. at 267.

188.

See also Paul W. Mollica, FederalSummary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L.

REV. 141, 141, 182 (2000) (attributing to relaxed summary judgment standards the decline in
federal civil trials from 8.5% in 1973 to 2.3% in 1999, and warning that "some current
applications of Rule 56 press against tolerable constitutional limits").
189. It is not clear from Judge Donald's article how many of the abusive motions are
Celotex-type motions. However, the phenomenon deplored by Judge Donald-movants'
lawyers ignoring facts that are already in the record-echoes the situation in Celotex. See 477
U.S. at 335-36 (Brennan, I., dissenting) (pointing out that the three items of evidence eventually
found sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact were already in the record when
Celotex moved for summary judgment).
190. Interestingly, all four of these articles assign the same cause to the Supreme Court's
enthusiasm for sumrnmaryjudgment: the "perception that a litigation explosion exists," Stempel,
supra note 171, at 96, and "docket pressures on the federal judiciary," Issacharoff &
Loewenstein, supra note 173, at 73. Judges Wald and Donald give fuller accounts of the
reasons behind the liberalization of summaryjudgment. Judge Wald notes that the 1986 trilogy
was decided at a time of "increasing concerns about the litigation explosion, a flood of prisoner
and pro se cases swamping the trial courts, a diminishment in public sympathy for the
downtrodden, and an escalation of rhetorical attacks on 'judicial activism.'" Wald, supra note
176, at 1907. Similarly, Judge Donald notes the "crisis of resources" in the federal courts, but
assigns this crisis to "numerous vacancies on the federal bench" and the "increased
federalization of [criminal] offenses." Donald & Plouffe, supra note 184, at 262.
191. 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1998).
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served chicken contaminated by camphylobacter bacteria, resulting in food
poisoning.' 92 There was no doubt that camphylobacter was the causative
agent; the only question was the source of the bacteria.'93 Unfortunately, the
McCarleys had not saved a sample of the allegedly contaminated chicken,
and, on the same day that he ate the chicken, Mr. McCarley had eaten a
breakfast of bacon, eggs, and rice.'9 4 The bacon also had not been tested for
camphylobacter.'" Because camphylobacter can be carried by both chicken
and bacon, the physician who examined Mr. McCarley was unable to testify
to a medical certainty at his deposition that the chicken, as opposed to the
bacon, was the source of the camphylobacter. However, he did testify that
"chicken was at the top of the list."'"
With the case in this posture, the defendant moved for summary judgment
on the ground that "the McCarleys could not establish the element of
causation."' 97 Obviously, this motion came very close to a pure Celotex-type
motion. The defendant pointed out to the court that the plaintiff could not
carry its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
chicken, and not the bacon, was the source of the bacteria.' 98 The doctor's
inability to state to a medical certainty that the chicken caused the food
poisoning left the record in a classic state of equipoise; therefore, the party
having the burden of proof, the plaintiff, could not carry that burden, and the
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" The trial court
granted the summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. 2"
The Tennesse Supreme Court reversed.2"' In doing so, it reaffirmed the
burden-shifting analysis adopted in Byrd, as well as Byrd's "no conclusory
assertion" rule. The court first chided the lower courts for not following the
proper "burden shifting analysis applicable to summaryjudgment dispositions."
In the court's view, the court of appeals "bypassed the moving parties' initial
burden and addressed only the sufficiency of the non-moving parties'
opposing evidence."203 The court held that the appellate court "erred in
focusing on the non-moving parties' burden without first addressing whether
that burden was actually triggered. 2 °4 The court's delineation of what it takes
to trigger the nonmovants' burden relied entirely on Byrd and left no doubt

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 587.

203.
204.

Id. at 587-88.
Id. at 588.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 587.

Id.
200. Id. at 586.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 587.
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that the Byrd test differs significantly from the Celotex test. In setting
Tennessee apart from the federal practice, the McCarley court made four
statements, citing to Byrd after each:
(1) "A party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate the absence
2 ' Here, state and federal law are
of any genuine and material factual issues.""
identical; even the Celotex plurality said that the movant bore the burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
(2) "Mere 'conclusory assertion[s] that the non-moving party has no
evidence [are] clearly insufficient."' 2 On this point, as we have seen,
Tennessee law seems to depart from federal law. Celotex allows the movant
to "point to" a lack of evidence in the record. Under Celotex, there is no
requirement that the movant itself produce evidence in support of its motion.
Thus, the movant's assertion that the nonmovant has no evidence to support
an element of its claim may be made in a "conclusory assertion."
(3) "The movant must either affirmatively negate an essential element of
the nonmovant's claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense."2" 7
Here we have it. The requirement that the movant negate an essential element
of the nonmovant's claim is a throwback to Adickes, a requirement expressly
repudiated by the Celotex plurality. And, of course, the alternative--conclusively
establishing an affirmative defense-is a traditional way for the defendant to
defeat the plaintiffs claim by carrying its own burden of proof.' 8 Despite
occasional assertions that the Tennessee Supreme Court in Byrd "essentially
adopted the '1986 trilogy,"'29 McCarley makes it clear that Tennessee has
rejected the Celotex standard for summary judgment."
(4) "If the movant does not negate a claimed basis for the suit, the
nonmovant's burden to produce either supporting affidavits or discovery
205. Id. (citing Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214).
206. Id. (citing Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215).
207. Id. (citing Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n.5).
208. See, e.g., Fowler v. Happy Goodman Family, 575 S.W.2d 496,498 & n.2,499 (Tenn.
1978) (holding that defendant failed to produce sufficient evidence to support an affirmative
defense of fraud in the inducement to action on contract).
209. Kireyczykv. MF Athletic Club, No. 01AOI-9612-CV0549, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS
550, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1997); see also Baumgardner v. ACD Tridon N. Am., Inc.,
No. 01-A-01-9806-CV00307, 1998 WL 652575, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1998). In the
only non-Tennessee case to cite Byrd, the New Jersey Supreme Court relies on it to list
Tennessee among the "majority" of state courts that have "adopted" the trilogy. Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 666 A.2d 146, 155-56 (N.J. 1995).
210. It is true that the court has never said, "We reject the Celotex standard for summary
judgment." See BANKS & ENTMAN, supranote 87, § 9-4(m), at 704, 709 (stating that "it is not
clear whether, or how, the summary judgment burden for movants who do not bear the burden
of persuasion at trial has been lowered in Tennessee," but citing McCarley for the proposition
that "despite apparent approval in Byrd v. Hall, the Celotex method has been rejected in
Tennessee"). However, the court's insistence that Justice White's concurrence "puts a finer
point" on the plurality position means that it will never have to explicitly reject Celotex. Its
reading of Celotex pretermits the admission of any conflict between the state and federal rules.
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materials is not triggered and the motion for summary judgment fails."2 11
Clearly, under this analysis, the movant's burden is significantly higher than
under federal law, and nonmovants in Tennessee courts will, theoretically, be
forced to respond to summary judgment motions less often than will those in
federal courts. 2
Applying this analysis to the McCarley case, the court pointed out that the
evidence relied on by the defendant merely "cause[d] doubt as to whether the
chicken or the bacon caused Mr. McCarley's illness."2 3 However, the court
explained why it is not enough merely to create doubt about causation:
"Because [the defendant] failed to negate a basis of the McCarleys' claim, the
McCarleys' burden of production was never triggered."2 4 It seems clear that
the defendant's motion in McCarley would have been sufficient to shift the
burden of production under Celotex. By pointing to the doctor's testimony,
which was in equipoise with respect to the causation issue, the defendant
could surely have alleged that the plaintiff would be unable to carry its burden
of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence, thereby forcing the
plaintiff to produce the additional evidence which was, in fact, produced in
the McCarley case. Unlike the holding in Byrd itself, which rested on the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's response to the motion, the holding in McCarley
rested squarely on the insufficiency of the motion. By using the Byrd dicta as
the basis of its holding, the McCarley court cemented the distinction between
state and federal summary judgment practice in Tennessee.2 1
D. Byrd in the Tennessee Court of Appeals
As of September 15, 2001, Byrd had been cited 889 times in all, with 833
of those cites found in Tennessee Court of Appeals decisions." 6 The use of

211. McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 (citing Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n.5).
212. But see infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
213. 960 S.W.2d at 588.
214. Id. at 589. Although it was not necessary to the decision, the court addressed the
sufficiency ofthe plaintiffs' response to the motion, which included Mrs. McCarley's testimony,
as well as the examining physician's. Id. "Mrs. McCarley testified that the chicken had an
unusual odor, looked strange, and 'didn't taste right."' Id. The court held, as a matter of
substantive law, that causation in food poisoning cases "may be established by either expert
testimony or through a combination of both expert and lay testimony." Id. Therefore, the
record contained evidence from which ajury could find that the food poisoning was caused by
the chicken.
215. The Tennessee Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its adherence to the Byrd standard.
Staples v. CBL & Assocs., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 & n.2 (Tenn. 2000).
216. This statistic is derived from use of the KeyCitesm service of Westlaw®. It is an
interesting statement from a materialist perspective because it illustrates the way in which
technologies enable us to make new kinds of statements. While this kind of statement would
not have been impossible to make in pre-Westlaw@ days, it would have been much more
difficult.
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Byrd by the court of appeals falls into three discrete categories: (1) the
"essential element" language, which focuses on the nonmovant's response; (2)
the "burden-shifting" and "specific facts" language, which also focuses on the
nonmovant's response; and most importantly, (3) the "conclusory assertion"
language, which focuses on the movant's burden. The "essential element"
language was the portion of Celotex that was quoted by the court of appeals
in five cases decided in the interim between Celotex and Byrd."7 In one preByrd case not cited by the supreme court, the court of appeals cited the
"essential element" language as a comment on the movant's burden:
Moving parties may demonstrate that they are entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law in several ways. First, they may affirmatively negate an
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Second, they may
conclusively establish an affirmative defense that defeats the nonmoving
party's claim. Third, they may demonstrate that the nomnoving party cannot
establish an essential element of its case."'
This final alternative, of course, is a Celotex-type motion, and has been
repudiated by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Occasionally, courts still quote
the "essential element" language as if it describes the movant's burden:
In appropriate cases, however, where the parties have had the opportunity to
engage in discovery and to flesh out the relevant facts, a defendant moving
for summary judgment may be able to meet [the initial burden of
demonstrating that there are no disputed, material facts creating a genuine
issue for trial] by demonstrating that, even if the facts are viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff still cannot establish an essential
element of her claim.2" 9
Closer examination reveals that these cases do not permit movants to make an
unsupported motion, but rather describe the court's review of the plaintiff's
evidence in opposition to the motion.220

217. See Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214 n.3; see also supra notes 80-81.
218. Caledonia Leasing & Equip. Co. v. Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman, McBride
& Prewitt, 865 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
219. Best v. Distribution & Auto Servs., No. I OAO1-9812-CH-00652, 1999 WL 704730,
at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1999).
220. See, e.g., Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. M1999-00064-COA-R9-CV, 2001
WL 846045, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2001) (deciding that when a child was injured by
a sharp object in defendant's store, the plaintiffs failed to establish essential elements of res ipsa
loquitur because they could not produce evidence "that the instrumentality that injured their son
was under the exclusive control of [defendant]" or that "the negligence of [defendant's]
employees is the only cause of their son's injury"); LaQuiere v. McCollum, No. M 1999- 00926COA-RIO-CV, 2001 WL 177079, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2001) (holding, in suit for
specific performance of land sales contract, that plaintiff was unable to produce evidence to
refute the defendant's showing that the "price adjustment provision in the contract [was] not

2001]

LEGACY OF BYRD v. HALL

The second portion of Byrd v. Hall that appears frequently in the
reception history is the "burden-shifting" and "specific facts" language, which
also focuses on the adequacy of the nonmovant's response. For example, in
Sutherlandv. FoodLion, Inc.,221 the court stated,
When the party seeking summary judgment makes a properly supported
motion, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific
facts, not legal conclusions, by using affidavits or the discovery materials
listed in Rule 56.03, establishing that there are indeed disputed, material
facts creating a genuine issue that needs to be resolved by the trier of fact
and that a trial is therefore necessary. The nonmoving party may not rely
upon the allegations or denials of his pleadings in carrying out this burden
as mandated by Rule 56.05.'
Sutherlandis a typical case invoking this language. There the plaintiff alleged
that, while shopping in defendant's store, she had slipped on a broken egg that
had been partially cleaned up. 2 The law required plaintiff to show either that
(1) the store's employees created the condition; (2) the store had actual notice
of the condition; or (3) the store had constructive notice of the condition.224
Food Lion astutely submitted affidavits from "each employee on duty at the
time of plaintiff's fall" and also relied on "plaintiffs own deposition" to
negate the possibility of each of these three alternatives.225 Specifically, to
negate constructive notice, one employee "state[d] in his affidavit [that] he
heard something like an egg fall on the floor and then within seconds, heard
plaintiff fall. '226 Plaintiff responded that "the egg appeared to have been
partially cleaned, '227 but the court held that this "assertion" was not sufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact because "[tihe employees' affidavits
establish that no Food Lion employee made an attempt to clean egg in this
area of the store. ' 22 Therefore, the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of
presenting specific facts to support the notice element of her claim, and
summary judgment was proper.229

clear, definite, and complete"); Best, 1999 WL 704730, at *I (holding that evidence regarding
plaintiff's employment, company policy, and company practice failed to support an element of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act claim that plaintiff was treated less favorably because of her
pregnancy).
221. No. 01 AO 1-9309-CV-00414, 1994 WL 108889, at *I (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1994).
222. Id. (quoting Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215).
223. Id.
224. See id.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
It is unclear from the court's opinion whether her "assertion" about the partially

cleaned egg was contained in her complaint or in her deposition. If it was contained in her
deposition, then it seems the summaryjudgment was improper, because her observation would
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Another typical use of this language occurs when the nonmovant,
typically the plaintiff, cannot produce the kind of evidence that is legally
required. For example, in Logan v. Winstead,23 the plaintiff sued his criminal
defense attorney for malpractice, and the defendant submitted his own
affidavit negating every allegation ofthe plaintiff's complaint and opining that
he had satisfied the applicable standard of care."' Thus, the court held, the
burden had shifted to plaintiff to "set forth specific facts ... establishing that
there are indeed disputed material facts creating a genuine issue" for trial.232
Because plaintiff failed to produce "expert testimony concerning the
applicable standard of care for a criminal defense attorney in this jurisdiction
or how this standard of care was breached by the defendant," summary
judgment for the defendant was proper.233 It is worth noting that this use of
summary judgment operates against legal malpractice plaintiffs. Because the
law of Tennessee allows an attorney to opine that he has met the applicable
standard of care, and because it is notoriously difficult to find attorneys
willing to testify against one another, the legal malpractice plaintiff in
Tennessee has a "tough row to hoe," in Judge Wald's words. 3 Still, at least
Tennessee summary judgment law requires the defendant to submit her own
affidavit; even this minimal burden is more than would be required in federal
court, where the defendant could simply allege that the plaintiff could not
prove that the defendant's conduct fell below the standard of care.235 On the
whole, therefore, we can conclude that the plaintiffs "tough row to hoe" in
Tennessee legal malpractice cases is a result of the substantive law and the

allow an inference that an employee had tried to clean the egg, thereby creating a credibility
issue.
230. No. 03A01-9902-CV-00057, 1999 WL 538208, at *I (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 1999).
23 1. Id. at *2.
232. Id..
233. Id.; accordHutter v. Cohen, 55 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
in legal malpractice case, when defendant attorneys submitted their own affidavits opining that
they had complied with applicable standard of care, affidavit of plaintiff, who "had attended law
school, but did not graduate" and who "had discussed his cases with other attorneys in Blount
County, Tennessee" was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact); Horton v.
Hughes, 971 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in legal malpractice case,
when defendant submitted his own affidavit and affidavits from three other lawyers opining that
he had complied with applicable standard of care, affidavit of plaintiff prisoner, a nonlawyer,
was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact). But see Huter, 55 S.W.3d at 577
(Susano, J., dissenting) (contending that attorneys' affidavits were insufficient to trigger
plaintiff's duty to respond because they failed to negate every act of malpractice alleged in the
complaint).
234. Wald, supra note 176, at 1923; see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
235. Of course, the Erie doctrine dictates that the Celotex standard of summary judgment
would apply in a diversity action in federal court. See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). Despite the differing summary judgment standards in state and federal courts,
in Tennessee there is no evidence, empirical or anecdotal, that this difference has led to forumshopping.
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practical problem of engaging a legal expert, not a result of the law of
summary judgment.
Finally, and most importantly, the court of appeals has used the portion
of Byrd that prohibits "conclusory assertions": "As our Supreme Court said
in Byrd v. Hall, '[a] conclusory assertion that the non-moving party has no
evidence is clearly insufficient' to shift the burden to the non-moving party to
'
produce its evidence of the fact on which it relies."236
Because Celotex-type
237
motions are rare even in federal practice and still rarer in Tennessee
practice,238 the most interesting cases addressing the movant's burden have not
invoked this language directly but instead have addressed the movant's burden
in the context of supported motions. In two early post-Byrd cases, the court
of appeals went so far as to require the movant to negate every material
allegation of the plaintiff's complaint. In Moffitt v. Smith,239 the court
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a legal malpractice
case because the supporting affidavit failed to negate every act of malpractice
alleged in the complaint. While the affidavit "address[ed] ...defendant's
conduct in the trial of the case and the pretrial court related discovery
matters," 2" it failed to address plaintiffs allegation that defendant "fail[ed]
to properly investigate the case prior to trial."24 ' Therefore, the court held
that the burden of production never shifted to plaintiff because defendant
failed to meet his burden to "submit affirmative evidence that negates an
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim."242 Similarly, in Williams
v. Williamson County Board of Education,243 the court reversed a summary
judgment as to plaintiff's claim that her supervisor had intentionally interfered
with her contract of insurance by encouraging the insurance company not to
pay a claim.2" The court held that the defendant supervisor's motion for
summary judgment was not properly supported on this issue because "[h]e
does not point to any evidence in the record showing an absence of malice or
that the contract was not breached. In his affidavit he does not245
even deny that
he intended to prevent the payment of the insurance claims.

236. Pack v. Ponak, No. M2000-02285-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 703883, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. June 22, 2001) (quoting in part Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215).
237. See supra note 24.
238. See infra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
239. No. 02A01-9206-CC-00171, 1993 WL 97459, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1993).
240. Id. at *2.
241. Id.
242. Id. at *3 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). But see Hutter
v. Cohen, 55 S.W.3d 571, 574 & n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant attorneys even though their affidavits did not address specific acts of malpractice
alleged in the complaint).
243. 890 S.W.2d 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
244. Id. at 789.
245. Id. at 791.
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E. The "Nip at the Heels " Doctrine
Another, more recent development with respect to the movant's burden
is the "nip at the heels"2 " doctrine in the Eastern Section. In Madison v.
Love, 21 7 a mother sued a night club for the wrongful death of her daughter,
who had collapsed at the club after the release of "theatrical fog" containing
propylene glycol.248 The mother alleged that employees of the club
negligently delayed seeking medical attention for her daughter after she
collapsed, and that this delay caused her death.249 The defendant moved for
summaryjudgment, relying on the medical examiner's report, which listed the
cause of death as unknown.250 The plaintiff responded to the motion by
offering the testimony of the victim's sister, who observed the interaction
between the victim and the club employees, and the report of the Emergency
Medical Services unit that transported her to the hospital.25 1 The trial court
granted summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed, noting that
there was no genuine issue of material fact because the plaintiff had failed to
produce medical evidence that the delay in treatment caused her daughter's
death.2" 2 The Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal and
remanded for reconsideration in light of McCarley.2" On remand, the court
of appeals held that the defendant's motion did not trigger the plaintiff's
burden to respond because the affidavit of the medical examiner failed to
negate the element of causation.254 In order to negate causation, the defendant
would have had to produce evidence that the delay in treatment "did not cause
of contribute" to the victim's death; instead, the defendant's evidence simply
indicated that the witness was unable to state a cause of death.2" In the
court's words, "[m]aterial supporting a motion for summary judgment must
do more than 'nip at the heels' of an essential element of a cause of action; it
must negate that element."256 Put another way, "[a]n affidavit which simply
casts doubt on a plaintiff's claim is not sufficient to require the plaintiff to

engage in a battle of facts 'on the papers.

'257

246. Madison v. Love, No. E2000-0 i 692-COA-RM-CV, 2000 WL 1036362, at *2 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 28, 2000).
247. No. 03A01-9903-CV-00069, 1999 WL 1068706, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24,
1999), on remand 2000 WL 1036362.
248. Madison, 1999 WL 1068706, at *1.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at *2, *4.
253. Madison v. Love, No. E2000-01692-COA-RM-CV, 2000 WL 1036362, at * I(Tenn.
Ct. App. July 28, 2000).
254. Id. at *1-*2.
255. Id. at *2.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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A second "nip at the heels" case is Barredo v. Robert Orr-Sysco Food
ServicesLLC.258 There, the defendant's employee made a delivery of cleaning
supplies to a local hospital.259 He stacked the supplies in the middle of an
aisle, and while an employee of the hospital was checking the delivery, "a box
containing six gallon-size Clorox bleach bottles" fell from the top of the pile,
injuring her. 2' The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that
"the undisputed facts do not show Defendant's delivery driver was negligent
and that the box could have fallen due to some intervening cause. ' 261 The trial
court granted summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed.262
Applying the Byrd rule that a defendant's summary judgment motion must
negate an essential element of the plaintiff's claim, the court held that the
defendant's evidence regarding how deliveries were usually unloaded-with
heavier items on the bottom-and the fifteen-minute time delay between the
delivery and the injury was insufficient to negate the element of causation:
Even assuming that the box could have fallen because of some intervening
act or Plaintiff's conduct, no essential element of Plaintiff's claim is negated
by this possibility. If it could have fallen because of some intervening factor
or Plaintiffs conduct, it necessarily follows that it could have fallen not
because of an intervening factor or Plaintiffs conduct, leaving only
Defendant's conduct as the cause.2 3
This passage is remarkable from an evidentiary standpoint because, normally,
evidence of a usual practice that would have placed the bleach bottles on the
bottom, rather than the top, of the stack, would raise only one inference-that,
in this case, they were on the bottom rather than the top and, therefore, could
not have fallen onto the plaintiff. Similarly, evidence of a time delay between
delivery and injury would normally lead only to an inference that something
other than the delivery driver's negligence caused the stack to topple. But,
here, the court rejected the normal direction of these inferences, or more
precisely, perhaps, rejected purely inferential evidence as a proper mode of
negating the element of causation. In the court's view, the defendant's
evidence "raises serious doubt as to the ultimate success of Plaintiff's claim.
This 'doubt' does not rise to the level of negating an essential element of
Plaintiffs claim but instead is a 'nip at the heels' of those essential
elements." 2" The court did not go so far as to hold that defendant's showing
did not trigger plaintiff s duty to respond; instead, it reviewed the record as

258.
2001).
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

No. E2000-0020680COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL416750, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24,
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
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a whole in determining that, because complete negation, not a "nip at the
heels," is required by Byrd, the summary judgment was improper.2" 5
This "nip at the heels" doctrine illustrates how serious Tennessee is about
requiring the movant for summary judgment to totally negate an element of
the nonmovant's case. In fact, we might call Tennessee's rule "the iron law
of negation." Tennessee courts are unwilling to resolve doubts "on the
papers." If the motion does not provide evidence that an element of the
plaintiff's case could not or did not occur, then the plaintiff will get the
opportunity to present her case to a jury. It is the jury, not the court, that will
resolve cases in which the movant's evidence merely "casts doubt" on the
plaintiff's case.
VI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE

The reception history of a non-legal literary text consists entirely of other
texts-texts about the work and texts influenced by the work. In contrast,
legal literary texts-at least those generated by institutions occupying an
authoritative position in the legal hierarchy vis i vis the other legal
actors--generate a reception history traced in legal practice, in the behaviors
motivated by the legal text and put into use in the everyday world.2" As
Stanley Fish writes, "performing an activity-engaging in a practice-is one
' In Judge Wald's
thing and discoursing on that practice another."267
and Judge
Donald's complaints about federal summary judgment jurisprudence, and

265. Id.
266. My distinction between non-legal and legal literary texts here is undoubtedly
overstated. Even non-legal literary texts may produce nontextual actions; texts like diet books
and cookbooks, for example, surely find their primary reception in practice. And we can each
think of a text that "changed our lives." My distinction is justified by the view that non-textual
reception of legal texts is somehow more visible than nontextual reception of non-legal texts.
But my view of legal practice is through a glass darkly, that is, through the lens of appellate
court opinions rather than the lens of empirical research or personal observation.
267. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE LJ.1773, 1777-78
(1987). Although I find useful Fish's distinction between doing something and talking about
doing something, I reject his position that legal practitioners are nothing but their practices, and
are incapable of self-conscious reflection on those practices. See id. at 1779-81, 1787 n.37
(focusing on the activity of "judging," but also refuting the claim that "lawyers need a theory
in order properly to perform their tasks"). I find Fish's position about the impossibility of selfconsciousness particularly unpersuasive in the context of this Article because I detect the
influence of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Byrd on the lower courts and the bar.
Fish asserts that "the one thing you can't do in relation to interpretive constructs is choose
them," id. at 1796, but it seems clear that when a lower court "follows" the decision in Byrd,
it is "choosing" its interpretive construct; similarly, when lawyers respond to the Byrd standard
by framing their summaryjudgment motions and responses so as to comply with Byrd, they are
"choosing" the interpretive construct that guides their practice. Perhaps Fish would not dignify
a lower court's obedience to Byrd or a practitioner's heedfulness ofByrd by characterizing such
obedience as a choice of "interpretive constructs."
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especially in Judge Donald's complaints about abusive summary judgment

filings, we have already seen traces of the reception of Celotex in practice.26 '
From the evidence provided by appellate court opinions, it appears that Byrd
has not radically changed summary judgment practice. Even in federal
practice, it seems, a Celotex-type summary judgment motion is as rare as
hen's teeth.269 This paucity is not surprising because almost all federal cases
will have an evidentiary record consisting of initial disclosures plus some
discovery materials."' Also, the local rules of some federal courts require the
movant to file a statement enumerating the allegedly undisputed facts. 7 '
These factors make it likely that even a federal movant will support its motion
with evidentiary materials.
Like some local federal rules, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03
requires that the movant file a "separate concise statement of the material
facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for
272
trial," -supporting each fact with a "specific citation to the record.
However, Tennessee has not adopted the initial disclosure rule embodied in
Federal-Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). Therefore, the evidentiary record must
be developed through the formal discovery devices and voluntary production
of evidence in support of motions. These factors, coupled with Byrd's
prohibition on "conclusory assertions," would make it likely that summary
judgment motions in state court would be supported by evidence or, at least,
by references to the record made in discovery. Indeed, one Tennessee practice
guide, noting the availability of the Celotex-type motion in federal court,
cautions, "In light of present state court pronouncements, this basis should be
invoked'in a Tennessee state court only where the movant is unable to submit
supporting affidavits, depositions, or other evidence.2 73 State court practice
is difficult to discern precisely from the appellate court opinions because the
courts are not always scrupulous in delineating what supporting materials
were filed with the motion. However, a review of the 800-plus appellate cases

268.
269.

See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
There are very few reported examples of Celotex-type motions. See, e.g., Bingham

v. Pittsburgh, 658 F. Supp. 655, 657 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (granting defendant's motion for
summaryjudgment supported only by its answer to the complaint).
270. Exceptions would be cases exempted from the initial disclosure requirements. See
FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(i )(E).
271. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. W.D. TENN. R. 7.2(d)(2) (requiring movant to indicate "by

serial numbering each material fact upon which the proponent relies in support of the motion");
U.S. DIST. CT. M.D. TENN. R.8(b)(7)(b) (requiring "separate, concise statement ofthe material
facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial"). However,
Judge Bernice Donald has found that this requirement does not necessarily discourage the filing
of non-meritorious motions; she notes that, on occasion, "attorneys moving for summary
judgment 'selectively' choose which facts will be listed inthe motion as 'undisputed." Donald
& Plouffe, supra note 184, at 266.
272. TENN,. R. Crv. P. 56.03.
273. PIVNICK, supra note 104, § 27-5, at 858.
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citing Byrd reveals that very few of these cases involve pure Celotex-type
motions.274 Much more common are motions made "[a]fter extensive
discovery ' or, at least, some discovery.276 It is also common for summary
judgment motions to be supported by the movant's own affidavit277 or by
expert affidavits or depositions. 271
Because Tennessee applies a stricter standard to the movant's initial
burden than does federal practice, there have been several cases in which the
courts have held that the movant's showing was insufficient to shift the
burden of production to the nonmovant.279 When the motion for summary

274. But see Pack v. Ponak, No. M2000-02285-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 703883, at * 1-'2
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 2001) (recounting, in suit for partition of real property, a motion
supported by a"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" that was "unswom" and which recited
deed provisions and "referred to an affidavit of a real estate agent," and reversing summary
judgment because the motion failed to negate the existence of an agreement, pleaded in answer,
not to sell the property); Hickory Woods Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Parman, No. 01 AOI 9901 -CH-00034, 1999 WL 617623, at *4(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 1999) (noting that in dispute
regarding homeowner's violation of restrictive covenants, on cross-motions for summary
judgment, neither party supported its motion by "sworn testimony or affidavit" negating
essential elements of claim or defense, and reversing summary judgment for homeowners'
association, noting that "[u]nder the state of the pleadings in this case, there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the action of the Association was reasonable under the
circumstances" (emphasis added)).
275. E.g., Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. MI 999-00064-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL
846045, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 2001).
276. See Hawkins v. Opryland, U.S.A., Inc., No. OIAO1-9309-CV-00408, 1994 WL
323092, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 1994) (stating that in the appeal of summary judgment in
a slip and fall case, "[t]he record on appeal consist[ed] of the technical record and the
depositions of plaintiff, Leta Hawkins and Dr. Thomas H. Moore, Jr.," suggesting that this was
all the discovery in the case).
277. See, e.g., Chrisman v. Hill Home Dev., Inc, 978 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tenn. 1998)
(describing fraudulent concealment case in which defendant developer submitted an affidavit
denying knowledge of flooding); Glover v. Lockard, Bingham & Kaplan, No. 02A0 I-9808-CV00228, 1999 WL 596384, at *1(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1999) (involving a legal malpractice
suit in which a defendant lawyer submitted his own affidavit); Logan v. Winstead, No. 03A019902-CV-00057, 1999 WL 538208, at *2(Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 1999) (reciting events in a
legal malpractice suit in which the defendant submitted his own affidavit opining that he
complied with the applicable standard of care).
278. See, e.g., Madison v. Love, No. E2000-01692-COA-RM-CV, 2000 WL 1036362, at
* I (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28,2000) (affidavit ofpathologist); Horton v. Hughes, 971 S.W.2d 957,
958 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (affidavits of defendant attorney and three additional lawyers).
279. McCarley v. West Quality FoodServ., of course, is the leading example. 960 S.W.2d
585 (Tenn. 1998); see also Pack, 2001 WL 703883, at *2 (holding that burden never shifted to
nonmovant because motion supported only by conclusory assertions); Madison, 2000 WL
1036362 at *1,*2(finding that affidavit of pathologist stating cause of death "unknown" was
insufficient to shift burden to nonmovant); cf Hutter v. Cohen, 55 S.W.3d 571,577 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2001) (Susano, J., dissenting) (arguing that in legal malpractice suit, defendant attorneys'
affidavits stating that they met the applicable standard of care should not have shifted the
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judgment is insufficient, the nonmovant is not required to respond. However,
the nonmovants almost always respond."' ° The impulse of the nonmovant to
respond to any motion for summary judgment, even one that appears to be
insufficiently supported, makes eminent good sense because there is no way
for the nonmovant to obtain a court ruling on the sufficiency of the motion
before responding. Thus, a failure to respond on the basis of the nonmovant's
lawyer's judgment that the motion is insufficiently supported would be
" ' Because of the virtual
foolhardy at best.28
certainty that the nonmovant will
respond in the vast majority of cases, both the original ruling on the motion
and any appellate review of the ruling are based on both the motion and the
response. The temptation for any court, trial or appellate, is to judge the
propriety of summary judgment in light of the entire record, without being
explicit about the respective sufficiency of the motion and the response. The
McCarley court criticized the lower courts for doing just this,28 2 and modeled
a more systematic, sequential mode of analysis in which, first, the motion, and
only then, the response is evaluated for legal sufficiency. Especially since
McCarley, the court of appeals has done a good job of analyzing summary
judgment motions systematically.283 Although the bar, as well as legal

burden to plaintiff nonmovant because they failed to address specific deficiencies alleged in
complaint).
280. Again, McCarley is the leading example. In only a handful of cases did the
nonmovant apparently file no response at all. See Williams v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 02A0 I9503-CV-00046, 1995 WL 575142, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1995) (treating sworn petition
for certiorari as motion for summary judgment and stating that "no response of the type
anticipated by [Byrd] was made to the sworn petition"); Sutherland v. Food Lion, Inc., No.
01AOI-9309-CV-00414, 1994 WL 108889, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1994) (stating that
in slip and fall case, defendant submitted employee affidavits to show lack of knowledge of
broken egg on floor; "[p]laintiff presents no proof in opposition to Food Lion's motion and in
essence rests on the allegations of her pleadings").
281. If plaintiffs feel the necessity of responding to motions for summary judgment even
in a jurisdiction with a high standard for the motion, it is easy to understand that the relaxed
federal standard for the motion will induce responses from plaintiffs even more often. This
analysis demonstrates the validity of the observation by Issacharoff and Loewenstein that the
relaxed federal standard will result in increased costs for plaintiffs with no concomitant increase
in costs for defendants who move for summary judgment. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra
note 173, at 93. Thus, the virtue of the Tennessee summary judgment standard is not that it
necessarily results in fewer plaintiff responses to summary judgment motions but that it
discourages defendants from filing unsupported motions by increasing the chances of denial,
if not at the trial stage, then at the appellate stage. The Tennessee practice thus more closely
equalizes the costs of both parties.
282. 960 S.W.2d at 587-88.
283. See, e.g., Horton, 971 S.W.2d at 960 (holding in a legal malpractice case that
defendant lawyer's expert affidavits "were sufficient to shift the burden of going forward with
the evidence back to [the plaintiff]). The plaintiff in Horton "was required to demonstrate that
he would effectively rebut the expert conclusions of [defendant] and his witnesses either by
presenting expert witnesses of his own or by demonstrating that [defendant's] conduct was so
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scholars, might hope that the appellate courts would more clearly describe the
supporting documents for both the summary judgment motion and the
response, the overall impression from the post-Byrd summary judgment cases
is that the Byrd standard, as clarified by McCarley, is working, at least in
terms of providing a rational framework for evaluating the legal sufficiency
of summary judgment motions and responses.
VII. CONCLUSION

Jerome McGann has said, "Every text has variants of itself screaming to
get out. . ."" The texts screaming to get out of Byrd v. Hall are the texts
submerged in that decision-a law review article that talks about the Celotex
decision, and the McCarley case, which actually applied the test created in
Byrd. Indeed, the text that actually erupted from Byrd, the McCarley case,
helped us see the one that never emerged, the scholarly critique of Celotex.
McCarleymade real what was only incipient in Byrd: Tennessee's break with
federal summary judgment jurisprudence.
Thus, we have come full circle to the question of whether Byrd is a bad
decision. Despite my classroom presentation of the case, the answer is clearly
a resounding "No!" Although we may be justified in deprecating the incoherence
and downright erroneousness that sets Byrd v. Hall apart from formal legal
discourse and moves it toward the realm of gossip, we must also acknowledge
the transformative power of the court's treatment of Celotex. Speaking as
both insider and outsider, perhaps conscious of its subordinate role in
interpreting a state rule of procedure "virtually identical to the federal rule,"
the Byrd court set Tennessee on a path that appears to have spared us the
dubious practices spawned by Celotex. Its determined clinging to the oldfashioned Adickes standard has resulted in a fairer balance between the
interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Nonmovants in Tennessee must incur
the costs of responding to every summary judgment motion, whether legally
sufficient or not, but for summary judgment movants in Tennessee, there is no
such thing as a cost-free summary judgment motion. The virtues of the Byrd
standard are amply demonstrated in its reception history. The body of postByrd cases indicates that both of the implied audiences for the Byrd
decision-the bar and the Tennessee Court of Appeals-listened to the court
and understood what they were being asked to do. The Byrd decision, and
especially the McCarley court's insistence on the analytical framework
enunciated in Byrd, has provided a reasonable, predictable summaryjudgment
jurisprudence for our state.

plainly negligent that expert evidence was not required." Id. at 960.
284. JEROME J.MCGANN, THE TEXTUAL CONDITION 10 (1991).

